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The treaties of the United States, under the [Articles of Confederation] 
are liable to infractions of thirteen [states] . . . . The faith, the reputation, the 
peace of the whole union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, 
the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it 
possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a 
government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to 
trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation? 
—Alexander Hamilton1 
INTRODUCTION 
Missouri v. Holland2 was to the federal treaty power what McCulloch v. 
Maryland3 is to its legislative power. In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote that “we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.”4 
In Holland, Justice Holmes interpreted the treaty power in the spirit of 
Marshall’s dictum by adopting a functional, adaptivist approach to its 
relationship to the Tenth Amendment. Referring to the degree to which the 
federal government may make treaties that trench upon what might ordinarily 
be traditional state functions, he wrote, “We must consider what this country 
has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved.”5 Holland was 
therefore far more than what generations of law students might recall as the 
curious case about migratory birds written by the Supreme Court’s most 
eminent Justice since Marshall; it was a case, like McCulloch, that would have 
vindicated their professors in claiming that we live today, not only in 
Marshall’s America but in Holmes’s too. The Constitution’s remarkable 
durability and resilience over 230 years should be ascribed in no small part to 
the prescient spirit of pragmatism that infuses cases like McCulloch and 
Holland. 
Yet Holland, alas, should now be discussed in the past tense. On June 2, 
2014, in Bond v. United States,6 the Supreme Court abandoned Holland. It did 
not say so. Nor did the Justices themselves believe Bond did so. Chief Justice 
Roberts, for the majority, and Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas, who 
concurred in the judgment only, arguing that Holland should be unambiguously 
overruled, all nonetheless wrote as though Bond did not disturb Holland. 
Commentators, too, did not see Holland’s demise. 7  A consensus rapidly 
emerged that the Court had decided Bond on a narrow statutory basis, 
successfully—even if, to the concurring Justices, objectionably—eliding the 
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 2. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 4. Id. at 407. 
 5. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. 
 6. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 7. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Federalism, Treaty Implementation, and Political Process: Bond 
v. United States, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 486, 486, 495 (2014); Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-
Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 73 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, 
Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 89 (2014); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Bond 
v. United States: Concurring in the Judgment, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 285, 306 (2014). For examples 
of earlier media commentary to the same effect, see infra note 98. 
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constitutional issue in Holland. But that consensus was premature; and it is 
mistaken. The Court tried, of course, to avoid the constitutional issues raised by 
Holland. But it failed. In fact, holding all else constant, had Bond honored 
Holland, the Court would have reached the opposite result; had Holland 
applied Bond’s analysis—a federalism background principle and commensurate 
canon of avoidance that will henceforth govern laws implementing treaties—
Holland, too, would have reached the opposite result.8 
We write to explain, and lament, Holland’s passing. We argue that it 
represented the most sensible reconciliation of the tension between the Treaty 
Clause and the Tenth Amendment. We further suggest that Bond is inconsistent 
with the Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas,9 for the Court there suggested 
that the federal government can do what Bond has now held that it 
constitutionally cannot. Yet the problem Bond creates is not limited to one 
inconsistency; it runs deeper. By abandoning Holland, the Court has 
handicapped the nation in a globalizing world and risked impeding the ability 
and reliability of the United States as a treaty partner. Without Holland, it will 
be well-nigh impossible for the nation to honor certain treaties—treaties that 
the nation has routinely concluded since its founding and, today more than 
ever, we expect, increasingly will. Mindful of the origins of the Treaty Clause 
in the experience with state practice under the Articles of Confederation, it is 
not only unfortunate but also hazardous for the Court to have unwittingly 
recreated one of the paramount problems the Framers sought to remedy at 
Philadelphia. 
Granted, the Court surely will not soon explicitly regard Bond as having 
overruled Holland. But for the reasons we develop, adherence to Bond’s 
analysis would effectively undermine Holland—notwithstanding the majority’s 
effort in Bond to avoid constitutional questions. Indeed, ironically, it is the 
Court’s misguided insistence on a background principle and constitutional 
avoidance canon based on pre-Holland federalism that renders Bond 
inconsistent with Holland. At most, Holland survives in name only. Unless the 
Court repudiates Bond’s analysis, it will have abandoned Holland’s core 
doctrine. We conclude, however, by noting that the Court could choose to 
reorient and expand its remarks in Bond so as to reinvigorate the Holland 
doctrine—without conceding error in the case (and thus perhaps saving 
institutional face). Such a reorientation would likely have the additional virtue 
of clarifying Holland’s holding in conformity with the actual principles that 
animated Holmes’s opinion. 
We develop the argument in five parts. In Part I, we clarify the 
conundrum created by the treaty power’s interaction with the Tenth 
Amendment. 
In Part II, we argue that a close reading of Holland reveals that its true 
rationale is far more subtle and forceful than the textual-delegation rationale 
often ascribed to Justice Holmes. We also consider how two oft-neglected 
 
 8. We assume that no alternative rationale or tacit consideration existed in either case; 
holding the facts, law, and judicial analyses constant, both decisions would have reached the opposite 
result at the times Holland and Bond, respectively, were decided. 
 9. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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decisions on which Holmes relied, Andrews v. Andrews10 and Carey v. South 
Dakota,11 offer critical insight into what Holland held—and why. 
In Part III, we scrutinize Bond and argue that, contrary to the consensus 
that it left Holland untouched, Bond gutted Holland by rejecting at least two 
indispensable predicates of Holmes’s analysis: first, that a treaty and its 
implementing legislation must be considered together; and, second, that a 
treaty’s validity under the Tenth Amendment immunizes that treaty’s 
implementing legislation against a generic federalism challenge. In contrast, 
Bond held that a treaty and its implementing legislation must be assessed 
separately under the Tenth Amendment—without considering the 
implementing statute in view of the treaty it implements; and that in doing so, 
the “statute—unlike the [treaty]—must be read consistent with principles of 
federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”12 Further, the Court erred 
by treating those “principles of federalism” as excluding, rather than 
incorporating, Holland’s interpretation of the interaction of the Tenth 
Amendment and the Article II treaty power. 
A careful analysis of what Justice Holmes held in Holland makes clear 
that Bond and Holland cannot be reconciled. We do not find it plausible to 
dismiss the Court’s troubling premise (“the statute—unlike the [treaty]—must 
be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional 
structure”) as a mere case of careless or ill-considered language. The quoted 
premise does not exist in isolation. It both motivated and enabled the majority’s 
approach to statutory interpretation and, in particular, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
reliance on the canon of constitutional avoidance based on supposed 
background federalism concerns. Had the majority honored Holland, no such 
concerns would have arisen. 
The Court could have plausibly decided Bond on the basis of non-
constitutional principles of statutory interpretation—resolving what it saw as an 
ambiguity in the implementing legislation without resort to a federalism-based 
canon of constitutional avoidance. But tellingly, it did not. To the contrary, the 
proposition that a treaty’s implementing legislation, unlike the treaty itself, 
“must be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our 
constitutional structure,” 13  constituted an indispensable predicate of the 
majority’s statutory analysis—the chief factor that resolved the putative 
ambiguity of the implementing legislation. The same predicate is emblematic 
of the Bond Court’s central mistake. Assuming, as every Justice correctly did, 
the constitutionality of the treaty,14 “there can be no dispute about the validity 
of the statute”15 based only on general “principles of federalism inherent in our 
constitutional structure.”16 
 
 10. 188 U.S. 14 (1903), abrogated by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). 
 11. 250 U.S. 118 (1919). 
 12. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 13. Id. at 2088. 
 14. See id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the Court’s consensus that 
the treaty is valid). 
 15. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
 16. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. 
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In Part IV, we argue that perennial critiques of Holland and the risks it 
allegedly entails ring hollow. No theoretical consideration or practical 
development since Holland has suggested any reason to disturb its doctrine. 
Indeed, critics have been unable to point to a single incident of abuse or 
concrete, not hypothetical, example of any risk that the decision supposedly 
poses, including the parade of horribles Holland allegedly set to march. Nor 
does Holland threaten to abrogate individual rights or other constitutional 
limits. It does not, as the Court wrote in 1957, “confer power on the Congress, 
or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the 
Constitution,”17 in particular, those rights set forth in the Bill of Rights and 
other provisions of the Constitution. 
In Part V, we consider Bond’s likely future consequences, especially its 
potentially deleterious implications for modern U.S. treaty practice. We suggest 
that the Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas18 implicitly required Holland’s 
doctrine. Bond’s abandonment of Holland therefore renders a core holding in 
Medellín, which is likely the most significant decision on the domestic U.S. law 
of treaties in decades, incoherent. More generally, Bond needlessly complicates 
the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. It diminishes the nation’s diplomatic 
capacity, handicapping it in its relations with foreign nations and threatening its 
ability to cooperate with them to tackle some of the most serious global issues 
in the twenty-first century. 
We conclude that the nation’s response to its experience under the 
Articles of Confederation, which motivated the Framers to lodge the treaty 
power in the federal government and to make treaties supreme federal law, 
remains equally vital today. Bond’s short-term effects may seem modest. But 
the nation may well come to regret abandoning Holland. For that reason, we 
conclude by suggesting how the Court might resolve the problems Bond 
created. Without calling into question the result in Bond, the Court could recast 
its copious references to federalism to bring its jurisprudence back into 
conformity with Holland—because the very “principles of federalism inherent 
in our constitutional structure,”19 on which the Court placed such emphasis, 
include Holmes’s reconciliation of the treaty power and federalism. 
I. THE TREATY CLAUSE VERSUS THE TENTH AMENDMENT? 
The treaty power and the Tenth Amendment, read together, present a 
conundrum. The Tenth Amendment provides simply, “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”20 Article II 
gives the President “power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”21 The 
conundrum lies in the consequences of applying, or not applying, Tenth 
 
 17. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 18. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 19. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2081. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 21. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Amendment limits to the treaty power in the event that the federal government 
were to ratify an Article II treaty22 regulating a subject generally reserved to 
the states—that is, an area of law that falls within the traditional power of the 
states to legislate on matters not delegated by the Constitution to the federal 
government.23 
If the Tenth Amendment limits the treaty power, a treaty obliging the 
United States to legislate on a subject reserved to the states would by definition 
be unconstitutional. The federal government would be powerless to enter into 
the potentially broad class of treaties obliging the United States to enact 
domestic federal laws regulating areas of traditional state competence. In 
practice, foreign nations would also lack an alternative way to conclude such 
treaties with the United States. They would be compelled to negotiate with each 
state individually in an effort to conclude fifty identical international 
agreements, which, under the Constitution, would be “compacts.”24 
The Compact Clause requires that agreements between states and foreign 
nations receive congressional approval.25 That a foreign nation might negotiate 
fifty substantially identical compacts with the states, each contingent on 
congressional approval, is implausible, not to mention inefficient. And even if a 
series of state compacts could be concluded, the United States, as a nation, 
would not be legally bound by them under federal law; it would not be a party. 
The nation would be all but powerless to enforce an international obligation in 
the event of a state’s breach. 
Because any federal law intended to implement international legal 
obligations under these compacts would be unconstitutional, it would also be 
left to the states to agree on how to implement those obligations uniformly 
under their respective laws and constitutions. This scenario, including the level 
of cooperation it would require, is—to say the least—improbable.26 Yet as a 
rule, international law recognizes and governs relations between nations, not 
their political subdivisions. So the United States, not the states, might incur 
international legal responsibility for any breach.27 That prospect, of course, 
ranked among the foremost defects of the Articles of Confederation. It is 
 
 22. Holland relied on the proposition that Article II treaties differ from other types of U.S. 
international agreements. References to treaties, unless otherwise indicated, are therefore only to 
international agreements made in conformity with Article II. 
 23. International law refers to countries as nation-states or simply states. Because we discuss 
both nation-states and U.S. states, for clarity and convenience, we refer to nation-states as “countries” or 
“nations” and to the states of the Union as “states.” 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. International law is indifferent to the denomination of an 
international agreement (compact, treaty, convention, etc.). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Under the Constitution, however, even though neither 
the Court nor anyone else has managed to explain what differentiates treaties from compacts, 
terminology matters. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 152 & nn.12-
13 (2d ed. 1996) (citing, inter alia, Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the 
Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 695 n.37 (1925)). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 26. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (concluding that Congress may not 
constitutionally commandeer the states to enter into compacts by which they would cooperate to dispose 
of radioactive waste produced within their respective jurisdictions). 
 27. Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 4, in Report 
of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
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difficult to imagine that the Framers understood the Tenth Amendment and the 
treaty power, in conjunction, to create one of the very problems they sought to 
resolve at Philadelphia. At any rate, today, with more and more problems 
requiring global cooperation and with the proliferation of multilateral treaties, 
the detrimental consequences of this reading of the Constitution could be 
serious and far-reaching. The United States could find itself increasingly 
isolated in foreign affairs and handicapped in its relations with other nations. 
Yet the alternative resolution to the conundrum is also problematic. If the 
Tenth Amendment does not limit the treaty power, the rights reserved to the 
states would be theoretically defeasible at the whim of the federal government. 
With the right treaty partner, it would seem that the federal government could 
enter into a treaty on a subject ordinarily reserved to the states and then enact 
legislation to implement its treaty obligations under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.28 The treaty and its implementing legislation, in turn, would preempt 
inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause. The principal obstacle to 
federal government intent upon usurping state authority over a local issue 
would be finding another nation able and willing to enter into a treaty including 
the necessary obligations. Echoing other critics, Justice Scalia thus suggested in 
Bond that “the holding that a statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms near 
schools went beyond Congress’s enumerated powers . . . could be reversed by 
negotiating a treaty with Latvia providing that neither sovereign would permit 
the carrying of guns near schools.”29 If the treaty power enables the federal 
government to coopt powers reserved to the states in this way, the Tenth 
Amendment would become no more than a “parchment barrier” in Madison’s 
felicitous phrase. 30  State authority over traditional state functions could 
atrophy as globalization, and the consequent need for international cooperation 
on issues once deemed quintessentially local, relentlessly broaden and advance. 
For most of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the United 
States remained a largely agrarian, inward-looking country and a comparatively 
minor player on the international stage. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine,31 while 
principally intended to convey to the major European powers that the United 
 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Indeed, depending on its details, the implementing 
legislation could preempt state regulation of an entire field of law ordinarily reserved to the states. 
 29. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Since Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), commentators have expressed concerns 
about this risk. We are aware of no evidence that it has ever materialized. Comparable hypotheticals 
have, however, become a staple of courses in foreign relations law. Holland is often deemed a “liberal” 
decision because of such hypotheticals. Yet the issue does not, in fact, track any partisan divide. 
Consider, by contrast to Justice Scalia’s example, what might be characterized as a “conservative” 
hypothetical: the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding that abortion’s 
regulation falls within the realm of rights reserved to the states. Thereafter, some states prohibit abortion 
while others legalize and regulate it. The President and Senate, dissatisfied with the unwieldy patchwork 
of state laws and believing abortion should be nationally prohibited, ratify the American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Article 4 of the Convention says that everyone has 
the right to life, which “shall be protected by law, in general, from the moment of conception.” Id. art. 4. 
Congress might then enact implementing legislation to uniformly prohibit abortion in all or virtually all 
circumstances, preempting state laws that authorize it. Countless similar hypotheticals, culminating in 
conventionally liberal or conservative outcomes, may be constructed. Holland’s political valence is de 
minimis. 
 30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 31. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 22-23 (1823) (statement of Pres. James Monroe). 
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States would not tolerate their intrusion in the Western hemisphere, also 
reflected a policy against being drawn into the maelstrom of European 
diplomatic maneuvering, colonial politics, and wars—a prudent stance for a 
fledgling nation that persisted, with some exceptions, into the twentieth 
century.32 Also, for much of the nineteenth century, custom remained the 
principal source of international law. Treaties, particularly multilateral treaties, 
were less common.33 And because treaties seldom implicated local issues, the 
conundrum raised by the potential tension between the treaty power and the 
Tenth Amendment remained largely academic. 
Nations began to conclude more treaties after the 1814 Congress of 
Vienna, however, and by the turn of the century, the number of treaties had 
proliferated. Even then, bilateral treaties remained the norm and multilateral 
treaties focused almost exclusively on bread-and-butter international issues. 
Nations rarely perceived the need for international regulation of local issues. 
Research discloses few jurists at the time who considered whether treaties 
could regulate matters that traditionally fell within the province of state law.34 
Nor had the Supreme Court yet considered the issue directly.35 But it would 
have been at least reasonable to suppose that the federal government could not 
sidestep the Tenth Amendment with a minuet patterned by the Treaty Clause. 
II. DECIPHERING HOLMES’S CRYPTIC OPINION IN HOLLAND 
That changed in 1920. The issue confronted the Court squarely in 
Missouri v. Holland.36 In 1913, Congress had enacted one of the nation’s first 
environmental laws, regulating the taking of game and migratory birds.37 Yet 
less than two decades earlier, in Geer v. Connecticut, the Court had said that 
“the right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the State of a 
police power,”38 notwithstanding incidental effects on interstate commerce. 
Relying in part on Geer, two federal district courts held that the 1913 statute 
usurped powers reserved to the states.39 
 
 32. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 206 (2005). 
 33. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
390, 396 (1998). 
 34. But see HENKIN, supra note 24, at 189-90, 456 n.57. Some scholars sought to establish 
“that the executive and legislative branches of the government in the period 1830-60 believed that 
treaties could not deal with matters not otherwise in the federal domain.” Id. at 456 n.57 (citing, inter 
alia, Ralston Hayden, The States’ Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 
566 (1917)). According to Henkin, however, these scholars “represented a minority view.” HENKIN, 
supra note 24, at 462 n.57. 
 35. In Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 & n.4 (2014), Justice Scalia noted that 
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901), and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619 
(1842), respectively, “embraced” and “arguably favor[ed]” the rationale in Holland—albeit, in his view, 
“without reasoning.” In contrast, in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 
(1836), the Court said that treaties may not expand the scope of the powers delegated by the Constitution 
to the federal government. Henkin suggests that “the basic principles of . . . Holland were laid down in 
the early years of the Republic.” HENKIN, supra note 24, at 463 n.65 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 199 (1796)). 
 36. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 37. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 673 
(2012)). 
 38. 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896). 
 39. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 
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Undeterred, the United States entered into a treaty with the United 
Kingdom, which, at the time, controlled Canadian territory. Migratory birds of 
value to both nations routinely traversed the border. The treaty thus required 
each nation to enact laws protecting migratory birds within their territories. 
Congress then enacted legislation substantially identical to the 1913 statute that 
two federal district courts had struck down40—but this time in the exercise of 
its Necessary and Proper Clause power to implement the treaty. Missouri 
brought suit claiming a Tenth Amendment violation. The Court therefore faced 
the core issue directly: may Congress legislate under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to implement an Article II treaty if the implementing legislation might 
otherwise exceed Congress’s enumerated powers,41 intruding upon an area of 
law ordinarily reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment? 
Justice Holmes answered in the affirmative with characteristic eloquence 
and brevity. Whether he truly intended to offer arguments in the alternative, 
Holland has been read to supply at least two rationales for the Court’s decision: 
one textual, the other functionalist or adaptivist. Much of the literature focuses 
on or presupposes the former (textual) rationale. Yet as we will see, it is 
implausible. We nonetheless explain and critique it briefly at the outset—in 
part because of its prominence in the literature but, more significantly, to 
situate it within the context of Holland’s actual, and far more compelling, 
rationale. 
A. The Textual Rationale 
The textual rationale seizes upon Holmes’s self-evident observation that 
Article II of the Constitution delegates the whole treaty power to the federal 
government.42 At first blush, Holmes thus seems to have supposed simply that 
any treaty, and any law made to implement a treaty, is by definition not 
reserved to the states. But that apparent argument rests on a semantic error. The 
Treaty Clause, which says that the President has “Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,” is not a delegated power 
comparable to Congress’s Article I, Section 8 delegated (enumerated) powers; 
rather, it is a mode of exercising power. It enables the federal government to 
make treaties to regulate international issues, including but not limited to trade, 
extradition, military alliances, borders, fishing and navigation rights, and 
 
154 (E.D. Ark. 1914). These decisions have been thought to show that, before Holland, no one thought 
treaties could empower the federal government to act in realms otherwise reserved to the states. Not so. 
Before Holland, at least three district courts had sustained the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
notwithstanding that substantially the same law might be constitutionally beyond federal power absent 
the treaty. See United States v. Thompson, 258 F. 257 (E.D. Ark. 1919); United States v. Rockefeller, 
260 F. 346, 348 (D. Mont. 1919); United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479 (W.D. Miss. 1919); see also 
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098 & n.4 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing two earlier 
Supreme Court opinions favorable to Holland). 
 40. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). 
 41. Many have framed the issue posed by Holland solely in terms of Congress’s Article I, 
Section 8 delegated powers. That is misleading, for it is not the question Holmes answered. The 
Constitution does not limit the federal government’s delegated powers to those of Congress. Nor is there 
a “plausible reason to suppose that the treaty power can extend only to subjects within Congress’s 
enumerated powers.” Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 11. 
 42. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. 
60  THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41: 51 
 
diplomatic relations. Unlike Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, the text of 
Article II, Section 2 neither specifies nor limits the subjects about which 
treaties may be concluded. 
Congress’s legislative power, insofar as that refers to its power to make 
laws, is likewise properly understood as a mode of exercising the powers 
“herein granted,”43 by Article I, Section 8 over enumerated subjects: regulating 
commerce, coining money, establishing post offices, making rules to govern 
the army, and so forth.44 The Constitution does not say that Congress has the 
“power to make laws”; rather, it vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” 
in “a Congress of the United States.”45 Hence, the word “Power[]” in Article I, 
Section 1 is not semantically equivalent to “Power” in Article II, Section 2, 
Clause 2. When we speak of Congress’s delegated powers, we typically mean 
the Article I, Section 8 “list” of enumerated powers, not Congress’s authority to 
make laws about the items on that list. In short, the word “delegated” can be 
ambiguous and therefore misunderstood in this context. Were we to 
conceptualize the treaty and legislative modes as freestanding powers that the 
Constitution delegates to the federal government, then the Tenth Amendment, 
which reserves to the states those powers not delegated to the federal 
government, would limit the operation of neither. That construction would 
effectively read the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution. It would have 
nothing on which to operate. 
To avoid this absurd result, neither the legislative nor the treaty mode 
should be understood as a delegated power within the meaning of the Tenth 
Amendment. The textual rationale alone would not only sweep too broadly; it 
is simply implausible. The other, and far better, rationale, as Holmes surely 
recognized, would likely be characterized in modern constitutional theory as 
functionalist or adaptivist. Our analysis of Holland will focus on this dimension 
of its rationale—for despite, or perhaps because of, the perennial debate about 
Holmes’s “cryptic” opinion,46 it has not, we suggest, been correctly or fully 
understood in the literature. 
B. The Force of Functionalism and Adaptivism in Holland 
Holmes made short work of the facts in Holland, recounting them briefly 
only to remark that “it is enough that the bill is a reasonable and proper means 
to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a State,” for “the question raised 
is the general one whether the treaty and statute are void as an interference with 
the rights reserved to the States.”47 But after so posing the question, Holmes 
appropriately reframed it. The issue, he said, cannot be resolved simply by 
 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 44. The Constitution does not, of course, delegate the power to make treaties to the states; it 
expressly prohibits them from exercising this mode of exercising power. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. But 
delegating the treaty mode to the federal government—without enumerating (as Article I, Section 8 does 
for Congress) or otherwise indicating the scope of the substantive legal issues delegated—does not tell 
us which, if any, such substantive issues the Tenth Amendment might nonetheless reserve to the states. 
 45. Id. art. I, § 1. 
 46. E.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 7, at 295. 
 47. 252 U.S. at 431-32. 
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reference to the Tenth Amendment. That Amendment reserves to the states 
only what the Constitution does not delegate to the federal government—and 
yet Article II delegates the treaty power to the federal government. Holmes did 
not, however, rest his argument on this observation alone, which, as noted, 
would be misguided. 
1. How Holmes Framed the Constitutional Question—and Why 
It is nonetheless worth pausing here to emphasize how and why Holmes 
reframed the constitutional question as he did. Missouri had argued that the 
federal statute interfered with its Tenth Amendment right to regulate migratory 
birds within its territory—not to make treaties.48 That is, of course, exactly as 
one would have expected. After all, the Court had previously characterized this 
right as an aspect of “the undoubted existence in the state of a police power.”49 
And just one year before Holland, in Carey v. South Dakota, the Court had 
applied the interpretive canon of constitutional avoidance50 to avoid deciding 
the constitutionality under the Tenth Amendment of the pre-treaty 1913 
Migratory Bird Act relative to a state law that regulated the shipping of 
migratory birds. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, construed the 1913 
Act narrowly, sidestepping the federalism issue and reiterating essentially what 
the Court had said in Geer: “a state has exclusive power to control wild game 
within its borders, and the South Dakota law was valid when enacted, although 
it incidentally affected interstate commerce.”51 The Missouri law at issue in 
Holland also did not affect interstate commerce more than incidentally, for the 
Court construed the Commerce Clause more narrowly at the time. Missouri 
therefore had every reason to conclude that the Tenth Amendment reserved to it 
the right to regulate migratory birds, free from federal interference. 
But Justice Holmes correctly reoriented the analysis to focus on the 
true—and constitutionally distinct—question. Rather than asking whether the 
Tenth Amendment reserves to the states power over the subject of the 
legislation (migratory birds), the question raised in Geer and Carey, he 
observed that the Amendment does not, of course, reserve to the states the 
power to make treaties. To the contrary, the Constitution expressly delegates 
that power to the federal government and denies it to the states.52 That was and 
is uncontroversial. It is not the gravamen of Holmes’s rationale, as noted in the 
preceding Section. Yet it enabled him to clarify an indispensable point: that the 
“question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the 
present supposed exception is placed.”53 
Holmes clarified, in other words, that the appropriate way to frame the 
constitutional question in Holland, in contrast to Carey and Geer, is not to ask 
 
 48. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). 
 49. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896). 
 50. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 122 (1919) (“Where a statute is reasonably 
susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be clearly constitutional and by the other of 
which its constitutionality would be doubtful, the former construction should be adopted.”). 
 51. Id. at 120. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; id. art. II, § 2. 
 53. 252 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). 
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whether the treaty power calls for an exception to the Tenth Amendment but 
the converse: whether the Tenth Amendment compels an exception to the 
federal government’s otherwise plenary power to make treaties. Recall in this 
regard that the federal government’s power to make treaties, unlike Congress’s 
power to make laws, is not textually limited to enumerated subjects. That is 
why, as Holmes thereafter emphasized, “[w]hether the two cases [striking down 
on Tenth Amendment grounds the earlier federal law regulating migratory 
birds] were decided rightly or not[,] they cannot be accepted as a test of the 
treaty power.”54 As he remarked in a critical but often misunderstood sentence, 
“[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute [under the Tenth Amendment] 
about the validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and 
proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”55 Holland therefore 
focused on the Tenth Amendment validity of the treaty—and only derivatively 
on its implementing legislation. 
Holland, Holmes continued, raised an issue quite distinct from those in 
Geer, Carey, and the two federal district court decisions that had struck down 
the earlier 1913 Migratory Bird Act—namely, whether the Tenth Amendment 
compels an exception to the otherwise (textually) plenary federal power to 
make treaties. The Court held that it does not. Holmes’s rationale for this 
conclusion is worth quoting here at length: 
It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are 
limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an 
act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the 
States, a treaty cannot do. . . .  
[But] that cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power [under the Tenth 
Amendment]. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that 
there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act 
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and 
it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘‘a power 
which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’’ is not 
to be found. . . . What was said in that case with regard to the powers of the States 
applies with equal force to the powers of the nation in cases where the States 
individually are incompetent to act. . . . [W]hen we are dealing with words that also 
are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that 
they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to 
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has 
cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The 
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not 
 
 54. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 432. This sentence has caused needless confusion and often been criticized, most 
recently by Justice Scalia’s characterization of it as “unreasoned and citation-less.” Bond v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Bradley, supra note 33, 
at 424 (speculating about this sentence’s interpretation). In context, it is clear that Holmes meant only to 
refer to the Tenth Amendment validity of the legislation, that is, valid in the sense of necessary and 
proper despite otherwise potentially applicable federalism limits. Legislation to implement a treaty may, 
of course, be invalid for many reasons that have nothing to do with the Tenth Amendment. It might, for 
example, bear an insufficiently rational relationship to the treaty under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
or abrogate express individual rights. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1 (1957). Holmes did not—because nothing in Holland required him to—speculate about such other 
arguable “qualifications to the treaty-making power.” 252 U.S. at 432. 
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merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question does not 
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question 
is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the 
Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding 
what that Amendment has reserved.56 
2. Holland’s Functionalist Rationale 
This quotation has become famous, not only for its significance to 
Holland’s rationale but also because it captures a particular, albeit 
controversial, view of political theory, judicial interpretation, and the relevance 
of history to constitutional adjudication. Were it adopted generally, it would 
exert an especially forceful influence on the broader field of foreign affairs law, 
which frequently invokes history, practice, tradition, and similar non-textual 
considerations. It is also essential to understanding what Holland necessarily 
held—and why Bond and Holland cannot be reconciled. So at the risk of 
belaboring Holland’s analysis, it is instructive to consider this passage in 
greater depth. 
Holmes began with the proposition that the treaty power is not just an 
alternative method by which the federal government may exercise in the 
international sphere the same congressional powers enumerated in Article I, 
Section 8; rather, Article II, Section 2, the treaty power, is a separate and 
independent source of federal lawmaking power. It both complements and 
augments Congress’s enumerated powers. The Treaty Clause gives the federal 
government—in particular, the “treaty-makers,”57 viz., the President plus two-
thirds of the Senate58—the power to make national law by international means: 
“It is obvious,” Holmes wrote, “that there may be matters of the sharpest 
exigency that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed 
by such an act could.”59 
For Holland’s critics, of course, it was, and is, not at all obvious. But 
Holmes did not believe that the Framers, with the experience under the Articles 
fresh in their minds, created a Constitution that would disable the United States 
as a nation from exercising the same powers as other nations, including the 
power to make internationally lawful treaties. International law, of course, does 
not place federalism constraints on treaties; and it is definitional of a nation that 
it has full capacity to enter into relations with other nations.60 The Constitution 
itself, for Holmes, established a fully empowered and functional nation. That is 
why, as he concluded, this authority must be found somewhere in the nation’s 
government.61 Yet in the federalist structure of the United States, it does not 
 
 56. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432-34 (citations omitted). 
 57. See generally HENKIN, supra note 24, at 175-214. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 59. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
 60. See, e.g., Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 
165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
 61. This conclusion might at first seem redolent of Justice Sutherland’s notoriously 
problematic theory in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)—viz., that 
sovereignty provides the federal government, and in particular, in Sutherland’s view, the President, with 
an extra-Constitutional source of power—although Curtiss-Wright postdates Holland. Yet Holmes 
clearly meant to interpret the Constitution itself. Nothing in Holland suggests any dubious thesis about 
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reside in the states. Nor could it. The national experience under the Articles 
established as much. And the nation’s history and experience since 1789, 
especially the Civil War (in which Holmes fought and to which he alluded in 
Holland) put any residual doubts on this issue to rest. 
Not coincidentally, Holmes’s reference to “matters of the sharpest 
exigency for the national well being” echoes Marshall’s proclamation in 
McCulloch v. Maryland. The Treaty Clause, like the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, is part of 
a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted 
to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which 
government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to 
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal 
code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for 
exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be 
best provided for as they occur.62 
Marshall’s words aptly capture Holmes’s answer to the question of the 
appropriate test, as he put it, of the treaty power. Given the “character of the 
[Constitution],” the treaty power’s scope and limits were not frozen for all time 
by “immutable rules,” which the Constitution set out in 1789. It is not 
accidental that the Article II power to make treaties, unlike Congress’s Article I 
power to make laws, does not enumerate an exclusive list of allowable subjects 
for treaties. The treaty power must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the 
exigencies of governing a nation “for ages to come.”63 It must be robust 
enough to handle crises “which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, 
and which can be best provided for as they occur.”64 
3. The Andrews Analogy 
Holmes’s reference to Andrews v. Andrews65 is far more significant in 
this regard than scholars have recognized. It clarifies the nature and force of 
Holland’s rationale. A routine estate dispute in Massachusetts, Andrews may at 
first seem to be no more than a convenient source for a poignant quotation. It 
reached the Supreme Court only because the plaintiff invoked the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, 66  injecting a federal question into an otherwise 
quintessential state-law dispute in which the decedent’s ex-wife and second 
wife each sought appointment as administratrix of his estate. The local issues in 
Andrews scarcely seem relevant to the international issues in Holland. 
Yet Andrews clarifies Holland’s functional rationale. While Holmes did 
not offer details about the case, his remark on it is informative: “What was said 
 
extraconstitutional foreign-affairs powers. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional 
Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (2000). 
 62. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819); see also THE FEDERALIST 
No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 63. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903), abrogated by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). Sherrer’s 
abrogation of Andrews does not affect how the latter informs the rationale in Holland: What matters is 
Justice White’s rationale and his constitutional methodology, not the validity of his conclusion. 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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in [Andrews] with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to 
the powers of the nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent 
to act.”67 The gravamen of Justice White’s opinion for the Court in Andrews 
was that the Constitution established a functional nation. It should therefore be 
construed, in the event of ambiguity or uncertainty, to effectively lodge every 
legal power indispensable to a well-ordered nation in a government, state or 
federal, of that nation. Understanding Andrews’s relevance to Holland requires 
a brief review of the former’s facts. 
Charles Andrews sought to divorce his first wife, Kate. But the law of his 
domicile, Massachusetts, disallowed it. He therefore moved to South Dakota 
for the short period of time needed to establish residence, secured a divorce 
decree in South Dakota state court, and then returned to Massachusetts. A year 
later, he married his second wife, Annie. When he died five years later, Annie 
and Kate each claimed the right to administer his estate. The trial court, while 
observing that Kate had unscrupulously “connived at and acquiesced in the 
South Dakota divorce decree,” found that she nonetheless retained the “right to 
administer his estate as his lawful widow,”68 for Massachusetts law prohibited 
Charles’s conduct and directed its courts not to recognize the South Dakota 
divorce decree.69 Because that decree could not be enforced in Massachusetts, 
Kate remained the decedent’s lawful spouse and administratrix of his estate. 
Annie countered that the Full Faith and Credit Clause preempted Massachusetts 
state law and compelled its courts to enforce the decree, making her, not Kate, 
the administratrix. 
Andrews’s relevance can now be fully appreciated. In the United States of 
1903, legally codified cultural norms conceived of marriage as a vital social 
institution. Andrews, citing earlier decisions, went so far as to describe 
marriage as “an essential attribute of government . . . upon which the existence 
of civilized society depends.”70 The Constitution does not, obviously, delegate 
power over marriage to the federal government; it is a power reserved to the 
states. But just as in Holland applying the treaty power despite what might 
ordinarily be Tenth Amendment reserved rights over the legal regulation of 
migratory birds generated a conundrum, so too, in Andrews, did applying the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause to the reserved authority of the states over 
marriage. The Constitution apparently required Massachusetts to give full faith 
and credit to, and hence enforce, the very divorce decree that its own law 
prohibited. One law or the other, state or federal, had to yield. 
A formal reading of the Constitution would have required that federal law 
prevail: A decree rendered in one state must be given full faith and credit in the 
courts of every other. 71  The Constitution therefore seemed to require 
Massachusetts to enforce the South Dakota divorce decree in its courts even 
though its own state law prohibited just that. But the Andrews Court reasoned 
that so applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to marriage would effectively 
 
 67. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
 68. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 17. 
 69. Id. at 29. 
 70. Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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deprive the domiciliary state of its reserved right under the Tenth Amendment 
to regulate marriage: a citizen of one state could evade its marriage laws, as did 
Charles, by the expedient of residing briefly in another state with lax marriage 
laws, obtaining a divorce decree there, returning to his domicile, and then 
enforcing the out-of-state decree in its courts—notwithstanding any domiciliary 
state law to the contrary, which the Constitution would preempt. 
Justice White declined to construe the Constitution to require this 
dysfunctional result. Because, he noted, the Full Faith and Credit Clause could 
divest the states of their reserved right to regulate marriage, and yet the 
Constitution does not delegate that power to the federal government, it would 
result that, in practice, neither the states nor the federal government could 
effectively regulate marriage—a social institution “upon which the existence of 
civilized society depends,” and further, one which “ha[d] always been subject 
to the control of the [state] legislature.”72 To interpret the Constitution in 
Andrews to nullify Massachusetts state marital law would therefore be to 
prioritize form over substance. It would “presuppos[e] that the determination of 
what powers are reserved and what delegated by the Constitution is to be 
ascertained by a blind adherence to mere form, in disregard of the substance of 
things. But the settled rule is directly to the contrary.”73 The Court concluded 
that it would be untenable to interpret the Constitution to “destroy”—that is, to 
deprive government in the aggregate (state and federal) of—the effective legal 
power to regulate marriage, a social institution indispensable to government.74 
The same principle, Holmes reasoned in Holland, applies, mutatis 
mutandis, to the treaty power. It would be untenable to construe the 
Constitution to deprive the federal government of the power to make and 
implement treaties indispensable to the nation the Constitution established “for 
ages to come.”75 Treaties, like the social institution of marriage during the 
Andrews era, are “an essential attribute of government.”76 To insist that the 
treaty power cannot be exercised if the subject would otherwise be reserved to 
the states would be to render an important class of treaties beyond the authority 
of any government of the United States—state or federal. For it would be 
implausible to suppose that treaties could be coordinated and enforced 
uniformly by the states. The treaty power is among the “powers of the nation . . . 
where the States individually are incompetent to act.”77 
Holland, in brief, applied the constitutional logic of Andrews—viz., to 
oversimplify somewhat, that the Court should construe tensions in the text to 
enable the Constitution to function effectively given evolving national interests 
and needs—to a converse situation in terms of whether, functionally, federal or 
state law should prevail: in Andrews, that logic prioritized state law; in 
Holland, federal. But the principle in each case is the same: a contrary holding 
 
 72. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 30. 
 73. Id. at 33. 
 74. Id. (“This would be but to declare that, in a necessary aspect, government had been 
destroyed by the adoption of the Constitution.”); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). 
 75. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
 76. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 31. 
 77. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
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would interpret the Constitution to deprive government (in the aggregate, state 
and federal) of power to regulate “a subject . . . upon which the existence of 
civilized society depends,”78  a power indispensable to the nation’s “well 
being,”79 and perhaps even to its “existence.”80 Neither Justice White nor 
Justice Holmes thought a sound interpretation of the Constitution, which 
establishes the United States as a nation, compels a conclusion that 
disempowers and diminishes that nation. 
C. An Anachronism? 
The preservation of migratory birds may not strike the modern reader as a 
“national interest of very nearly the first magnitude.”81 Nor would many 
citizens today describe the social institution of marriage as indispensable to the 
“existence” of civilized society.82 But it would be mistaken to dismiss the logic 
of these cases as anachronistic. At the time of Holland, migratory birds were, 
the Court emphasized, a crucial “food supply” and “protectors of our forests 
and our crops.”83 The federal government’s need to prevent their extinction by 
entering into a treaty—after lower courts had struck down its earlier effort to 
accomplish the same objective through the use of Congress’s Article I powers 
alone—is itself evidence of just how important this national interest was at the 
time. And whatever the truth of Justice Holmes’s characterization of the need 
to protect migratory birds, or of Justice White’s description of marriage, the 
principle advanced in both cases is no less forceful: the Constitution need not 
and should not be read to disable government (again, understood in the 
aggregate, federal and state) from legislating effectively on matters of national 
significance. 
Holmes stressed in Holland that a vital national interest could “be 
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power.”84 
Without the doctrine established in Holland, such vital national interests, then 
as now, would be beyond the power of the United States to safeguard and 
promote. That is the gravamen of Holmes’s argument: a Constitution intended 
to function effectively for the ages and to adapt to the exigencies of a constantly 
evolving nation should not be read to deny government the power to protect 
indispensable interests of the nation it constitutes.85 
As we will see in Part V, despite its relatively modest influence in the 
past century, contemporary international law and dramatic changes in the 
 
 78. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 31. 
 79. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
 80. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 31; cf. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
 81. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
 82. On the other hand, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), suggests that citizens 
continue to perceive marriage as a critical social institution. 
 83. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. Holmes did not argue that “need implies power,” a dangerously illiberal argument. He 
accepted that the Constitution limits as well as empowers government, and he suggested that limits on 
the treaty power exist. He denied, however, that those limits were properly to be ascertained simply by 
checking the list of Congress’s enumerated powers. Again, there is no “plausible reason to suppose that 
the treaty power can extend only to subjects within Congress’s enumerated powers.” Lawson & 
Seidman, supra note 41, at 11. 
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global legal order mean that Holland’s reconciliation of the treaty power with 
federalism remains even more vital to the national interest today. Only that 
reconciliation enables the Constitution to endure in this regard and to “adapt[] 
to the various crises of human affairs” we face in the twenty-first century.86 
Given the consensus that Bond did not overrule or substantially modify 
Holland’s core doctrine, however, why is there cause for concern? Because, as 
we explain in the next part, the consensus is wrong: Bond eviscerated Holland. 
III. HOW BOND HOBBLED HOLLAND 
In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review United States v. 
Bond,87 which squarely posed the issue in Holland for the first time in nearly a 
century. The film noir facts of the case generated no few chuckles. In 1997, the 
United States ratified the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC or 
Convention).88 It requires the parties to prohibit certain activities set forth in 
the Convention, including by “enacting penal legislation.”89 The prohibited 
activities include the development, possession, or use of chemical weapons, 
which the CWC defines as “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors,” which, in 
turn, it defines broadly as “[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on 
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to 
humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin 
or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced 
in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.”90 Congress implemented the CWC in 
1998.91 The CWC Implementation Act, modeled closely on the Convention’s 
language, made it a federal crime to develop, possess, or use chemical 
weapons.92 
In 2006, Carol Anne Bond, a microbiologist, discovered that her friend 
Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant by Bond’s husband. Seeking revenge, Bond 
stole toxic chemicals from her employer and ordered others on the Internet. On 
at least twenty-four occasions between November 2006 and June 2007, she 
spread these chemicals on Haynes’s car door, mailbox, and doorknob. Bond did 
not intend to kill Haynes; rather, she “hoped that Haynes would touch the 
chemicals and develop an uncomfortable rash.”93 Because the chemicals were 
readily noticeable, however, Haynes avoided them except on one occasion, 
when she suffered a minor burn to her thumb. Haynes repeatedly reported 
Bond’s conduct to the police. Eventually, they referred her reports to the postal 
service, which set up surveillance and filmed Bond stealing from Haynes’s 
mailbox and stuffing chemicals into her car muffler. 
Federal prosecutors indicted Bond for mail theft and—perhaps because 
 
 86. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
 87. 681 F.3d 149, 149-70 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 88. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317. 
 89. Id. art. VII. 
 90. Id. art. II. 
 91. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014). 
 92. Id. at 2085. 
 93. Id. 
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this charge alone failed to capture the seriousness of Bond’s attempted 
assaults—also for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229, the main criminal provision 
of the Act. Bond moved to dismiss this charge on two grounds. First, while 
conceding that her conduct could not technically be characterized as a 
statutorily exempt “peaceful purpose[],”94  she argued that this exemption 
implied that the Act should not be read to reach non-“warlike” conduct. 
Second, she argued that, if it did, the Act “exceeded Congress’s enumerated 
powers and invaded powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.”95 
The Third Circuit rejected her arguments, relying, in the latter case, on Holland 
to sustain section 229 as “necessary and proper to carry the [CWC] into 
effect.”96 
A. The Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland 
Because the federal government disavowed reliance on the Commerce 
Clause as the basis for section 229,97 leaving implementation of the CWC 
through the Necessary and Proper Clause as the statute’s only potential 
constitutional basis, Bond offered the Court an opportunity, were it so inclined, 
to overrule Holland. But the majority did not seem so inclined. It instead chose 
to decide the case on statutory grounds, thereby avoiding—or so it thought—
the need to revisit the constitutional issue it had decided in Holland. And since 
the Court’s decision, a consensus has indeed emerged that, for better or worse, 
the Bond Court successfully elided Holland and managed to leave its core 
holding undisturbed.98 
According to this now-orthodox view, the Court dodged the issue in 
Holland by applying the canon of constitutional avoidance and resolving Bond 
on statutory grounds alone. That is, in fact, not only the consensus among 
commentators; it is how all of the Justices evidently understood the majority 
opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, 
who concurred in the judgment despite vehement disagreement with the 
majority opinion, nonetheless understood it as the majority did.99 
The Supreme Court, so this reading of the case continues, essentially 
embraced the statutory interpretation of the Act that the Third Circuit had 
rejected.100 Avoiding consideration of the Tenth Amendment’s interaction with 
 
 94. Id. at 2086. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 162 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 97. See id. at 168-69. 
 98. To the best of our knowledge, all commentary on Bond to date takes this position. See 
supra note 7. For earlier media commentary, see, among many other examples, Adam Liptak, Chemical 
Weapons Treaty Does Not Apply to Petty Crime, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2014, at A13, and 
Ronald J. Bettauer, Supreme Court Limits Holding in Bond, Not Reaching Constitutional Treaty 
Implementation Authority, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (June 25, 2014), http://www.asil.org/insights 
/volume/18/issue/14/supreme-court-limits-holding-bond-not-reaching-constitutional-treaty. 
 99. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Thomas 
and Alito adopted Justice Scalia’s analysis in this regard. See id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 100. The Third Circuit, like the concurring Supreme Court Justices, concluded that the 
constitutional question could not be avoided because “while one may well question whether Congress 
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the Treaty Clause, the Court read the Act narrowly such that it did not need to 
revisit Holland: Roberts found it implausible to construe the Act as 
criminalizing Bond’s pedestrian efforts at revenge for marital infidelity. 
Congress enacted the Act, Roberts concluded, to implement the CWC’s ban on 
chemical weapons—not, as he colorfully wrote, to define chemical weapons so 
broadly as to “sweep in everything from the detergent under the kitchen sink to 
the stain remover in the laundry room” or to “make[] it a federal offense to 
poison goldfish.”101 
In short, by construing the Act’s text narrowly and inferring that 
Congress did not intend to criminalize conduct such as Bond’s, the majority 
rendered section 229 unobjectionable from a federalism perspective. The Court 
concluded that the Act simply did not reach any conduct vouchsafed to the 
states by the Tenth Amendment. Roberts thereby obviated any need for the 
Court to decide whether the Act—if it were interpreted to sweep more broadly, 
and if it were found to intrude upon traditional state functions absent a treaty—
could nonetheless be constitutionally sustained as necessary and proper to 
implement the CWC under the doctrine it had adopted in Holland. 
A cursory reading of the majority opinion indeed seems to bear out this 
view of the majority opinion and therefore to minimize Bond’s import. Roberts 
summarized the potential stakes in the Holland debate only to dismiss it as 
needless to resolve Bond. 102  He began with the canon of constitutional 
avoidance: that, as a rule, “the Court will not decide a constitutional question if 
there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.” 103 
Consequently, he considered whether a non-constitutional ground to resolve 
Bond existed and concluded that Bond’s statutory argument—that the Act, 
properly interpreted, did not reach her misconduct—supplied a sound one. 
Despite the Act’s facially broad language, Roberts found “no reason to 
think the sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in 
anything like Bond’s common law assault”; and at any rate, “nothing prevents 
Congress from implementing the Convention in the same manner it legislates 
with respect to innumerable other matters—observing the Constitution’s 
division of responsibility between sovereigns and leaving the prosecution of 
purely local crimes to the States.”104 The gravamen of Roberts’s argument is 
therefore clear: The Act excludes Bond’s conduct because the correct statutory 
construction of section 229, the one consistent with its text and Congress’s 
presumed intent, renders it inapplicable to “purely local crimes.”105 
 
envisioned the Act being applied in a case like this, the language itself does cover Bond’s criminal 
conduct. . . . [T]he statute speaks with sufficient certainty that we feel compelled to consider the hard 
question presented in this appeal.” Bond, 681 F.3d at 155. 
 101. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091. The majority concluded that “[t]here is no reason to suppose that 
Congress—in implementing the Convention on Chemical Weapons—thought” that “the global need to 
prevent chemical warfare [requires] the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to 
treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon.” Id. at 2093. 
 102. See id. at 2087. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2090. 
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B. Why the Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland Failed 
1. The Neglect of Holland’s Own Federalism Principles 
Despite the Court’s efforts, a close analysis of Bond reveals that it failed 
to sidestep the constitutional issues in Holland for at least three related reasons, 
summarized here and further elaborated below.  
First, recall that after citing the canon of constitutional avoidance, the 
Court proceeded from the premise that it “[f]ortunately [had] no need to 
interpret the scope of the Convention . . . . Bond was prosecuted under [section 
229], and the statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with 
principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”106 So framed 
by the Court, this premise is mistaken. To be sure, it is conceivable that this 
quotation reflects no more than ill-considered language. But the balance of the 
majority opinion suggests otherwise, and it is difficult to reconcile this 
statement with Holland. If the majority meant that treaty-implementing 
legislation must be read “consistent with” the same “principles of federalism 
inherent in our constitutional structure” as those that apply to legislation that 
does not implement a treaty, that proposition is manifestly inconsistent with 
Holland.107 Whatever else Holland held, there can be no question that it 
distinguished between federalism constraints on laws that do and do not 
implement treaties. 
Second, the same quotation reflects the Court’s struggle to avoid 
revisiting Holland. If we assume, as did every member of the Court, that the 
majority succeeded, then Holland remains good law and binding precedent. 
That, in turn, means that “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional 
structure,” as authoritatively interpreted by the Court itself, do not conflict with 
Holland’s doctrine; they incorporate it. Holland’s resolution of the tension 
between the treaty power and the Tenth Amendment, in other words, is among 
the “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.” It is also 
among the federalism principles that the Court invoked and therefore should 
have applied when it enlisted the constitutional avoidance canon in support of 
its resolution of section 229’s perceived ambiguity. Yet the Bond Court did 
not—as stare decisis and respect for precedent generally require—adhere to 
Holland’s conclusion about federalism principles in the context of a treaty-
implementing statute. 
Third, Holland held that a treaty and its implementing legislation must be 
appraised together under the Tenth Amendment; if the treaty is valid in this 
regard, so too is its implementing legislation. Bond proceeded from the 
contrary premise that the “statute—unlike the [treaty]—must be read consistent 
with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”108 The 
 
 106. See id. at 2088. 
 107. Had Holland truly been treated as good law by the majority, the Act at issue in Bond 
would not have presented an ordinary case of statutory interpretation—to be resolved in conformity with 
the same federalism principles that apply to a statute that does not implement a treaty. Bond mistakenly 
applied the same methodology as the federal district courts that had appraised the 1916 Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act before the Court’s decision in Holland. 
 108. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. 
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majority further reasoned that “nothing prevents Congress from implementing 
the Convention in the same manner it legislates with respect to innumerable 
other matters—observing the Constitution’s division of responsibility between 
sovereigns and leaving the prosecution of purely local crimes to the States.”109 
The majority’s assertion would ordinarily be unobjectionable. Nations frame 
multilateral treaties in terms that enable them to implement international legal 
obligations so as not to violate internal laws. Bond’s conflict with Holland in 
this regard arises because the majority’s premise—viz., that legislation to 
implement treaties must comply with the same federalism principles as apply to 
legislation that does not—directly contravenes Holland. Were that so, a treaty 
and its implementing legislation could be assessed independently under the 
Tenth Amendment, notwithstanding Holland’s insistence to the contrary, viz., 
that a treaty’s validity vis-à-vis federalism renders its implementing legislation 
valid under the Tenth Amendment—as necessary and proper to implement the 
treaty.110 
2. Holland’s Uniform Standard: Treaties and Implementing 
Legislation 
Each prong of the majority’s analysis depended ineluctably on the last of 
these flawed reasons—never acknowledged as such, still less justified—
namely, that the implementing legislation (the Act) and the treaty it implements 
(the CWC) may be appraised independently under the Tenth Amendment. 
Introducing the balance of the majority’s analysis, Roberts thus wrote that “the 
statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with principles of 
federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”111 Under Holland, that’s 
wrong. The validity of the CWC and the Act must be assessed together; 
logically, the two are inextricably linked. Holland held, among other things, 
that under the Tenth Amendment, if the treaty is constitutionally valid, so is its 
implementing legislation; if the treaty is not, neither is its implementing 
legislation. Roberts could interpret the Act not to reach purely local crimes only 
by neglecting, indeed subverting, this essential premise of Holland: The 
constitutional validity of an Article II treaty determines the validity under the 
Tenth Amendment of its implementing legislation. 
Holmes could not have made this more explicit: “If the treaty is valid, 
there can be no dispute about the [Tenth Amendment] validity of the statute 
under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the 
powers of the Government.” 112  That is why, recall, Holmes recast the 
constitutional question in Holland to focus on the treaty’s validity rather than 
that of the implementing legislation: “The language of the Constitution as to the 
supremacy of treaties being general, the question before us is narrowed to an 
inquiry into the ground upon which the present supposed exception [to the 
 
 109. Id. at 2087. 
 110. See 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
 111. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. 
 112. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). 
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treaty power] is placed.”113 Recall, too, that by “exception,” Holmes meant 
exception to the treaty power based on the Tenth Amendment, not exception to 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.114 In other words, the Tenth Amendment 
validity of the implementing legislation is derivative of and determined by the 
Tenth Amendment validity of the treaty. 115  That is why Holmes could 
conclude without hesitation that the holdings of the two federal district courts 
striking down similar laws—laws that did not, however, implement a treaty—
were irrelevant to the real issue in Holland. In contrast, Carey v. South 
Dakota,116 which found the 1913 Migratory Bird Act unconstitutional, did not 
raise the “test of the treaty power”117 at issue in Holland. Holmes accordingly 
prioritized analysis of the treaty. He assessed the validity of the treaty, not its 
implementing legislation, in light of the Tenth Amendment. 
Holland therefore began with the text of the 1916 treaty between the 
United States and the United Kingdom concerning the preservation of 
migratory birds. It “provided . . . that the two powers would take or propose to 
their lawmaking bodies the necessary measures for carrying the treaty out.”118 
Those measures, the implementing legislation challenged by Missouri, were 
passed “to give effect to the convention.”119 For the Holland Court, however, 
the validity of that convention, not its implementing legislation, determined the 
Tenth Amendment’s relevance vel non. 
After reframing the question, appropriately, as an “inquiry into the 
ground upon which the present supposed exception [to the treaty power based 
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on the Tenth Amendment] is placed,”120 Holmes thus considered the state’s 
principal argument: that “a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the 
Constitution,” in particular federalism limits, and that “what an act of Congress 
could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a 
treaty cannot do.”121 This is the core argument—an argument that turns on the 
treaty’s validity—that Holland considered and rejected: “The treaty in 
question,” Holmes reasoned, not the implementing legislation, “does not 
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.”122 He also 
recognized that “but for the treaty,” not the implementing legislation, “the State 
would be free to regulate this subject itself.”123 Consequently, he concluded, 
“the treaty and statute must be upheld.”124 
3. The Unavoidable Conflict Between Holland and Bond 
Now reconsider Bond. The justices took the constitutional validity of the 
treaty for granted.125 They did not question that the CWC involves “a national 
interest of very nearly the first magnitude,” deals with an issue as to which “the 
States individually are incompetent to act,” or requires “action in concert” with 
other nations.126 In short, they did not regard the CWC’s constitutionality as 
the relevant issue. Here again, the Bond Court’s abandonment of Holland 
emerges clearly in Roberts’s proclamation that the Court had “no need to 
interpret the scope of the Convention” because Bond was prosecuted under 
[section 229], and the statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent 
with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”127 
These words, and the balance of the analysis predicated upon them, mark 
a dramatic departure from Holland. The Holland defendants, too, were 
prosecuted under a law that Congress had enacted to implement a treaty. Unlike 
the Bond Court, however, the Holland Court did not state or imply that this law 
“must be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our 
constitutional structure.”128 Justice Holmes held to the contrary that, for Tenth 
Amendment purposes, a valid treaty renders generic “principles of federalism 
inherent in our constitutional structure” nugatory as putative limits on 
congressional power to implement that treaty. Assuming it to be, as both Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Holmes did, an otherwise constitutional treaty, 
Holland thus held immaterial the very same canon of statutory construction 
that Bond held mandatory. Stated otherwise, in the context of treaty-
implementing legislation, Holmes characterized Bond’s “principles of 
federalism inherent in our constitutional structure” as an irrelevant “invisible 
 
 120. Id. at 432. 
 121. Id. (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. at 434 (“No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of 
the State, but a treaty may override its power.”). 
 124. Id. at 435 (emphasis added). 
 125. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014); accord id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.”129 
Consider also the sharp (and irreconcilable) distinction between how 
Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue in, respectively, 
Holland and Bond—notwithstanding that each case arose in substantially the 
same posture and raised substantially the same constitutional question. Holmes 
focused first and foremost on the treaty: The precise “question before us,” he 
wrote, “[can now be] narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the 
present supposed exception [to the treaty power] is placed.”130 Chief Justice 
Roberts, in contrast, focused foremost, indeed exclusively, on the implementing 
legislation: “The question presented . . . is whether the Implementation Act . . . 
reaches a purely local crime.”131 In fact, in the Bond Court’s view, this focus 
obviated the need to consider the treaty. 
4. Bond’s Misguided “Background Principle” 
Only by rejecting Holland’s insistence on the mutual dependence of the 
treaty and its implementing legislation for Tenth Amendment purposes could 
the Bond Court shift its focus to the statute alone, which it then analyzed as 
though it were a routine exercise in statutory interpretation. And only by 
abandoning Holland could the Bond Court conclude that the Tenth Amendment 
constrained the reach of the Act. In contrast to Holland, Bond treated the 
federalism-based canon of constitutional avoidance as mandatory. 
The orthodox reading of Bond interprets the majority opinion to introduce 
a clear statement rule in the context of laws implementing treaties: Congress 
must be explicit if it intends implementing legislation to abrogate the usual 
limitations imposed by federalism. Illustrative of this reading is Professor 
Bradley’s conclusion that “[Bond] extends a federalism-based clear statement 
requirement, which was originally developed by the Supreme Court in the 
context of purely domestic legislation, into the realm of treaty-implementing 
legislation.”132 
To be sure, much language in the Bond opinion seemingly lends itself to 
this view. The Court characterized the clear statement rule as a “background 
principle[] of construction”133 and “conclude[d] that, in this curious case, we 
can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes 
before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes on 
the police power of the States.”134 In part because of such statements, it is 
understandable that Bond has been read to impose a modest clear-statement 
rule on treaty-implementing legislation rather than to abandon (or even reach) 
the constitutional issue in Holland. 
The Supreme Court could have, plausibly if controversially,135 held that 
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the Act did not reach Bond’s conduct by means of a variety of canons of 
statutory interpretation—without invoking the canon of constitutional 
avoidance based on federalism; after all, as Karl Llewelyn famously pointed 
out, there’s no shortage of them available to support particular results.136 But 
the Court saw the federalism background principle and canon as all but 
determinative, the principal factor that resolved section 229’s perceived 
ambiguity. 
We have repeatedly quoted the Court’s analytic predicate that “the 
statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with principles of 
federalism in our constitutional structure”137 because it so clearly underscores 
Bond’s abandonment of Holland. It also directly illustrates the Court’s 
misguided assumptions: first, that a mandatory federalism limit applies to laws 
implementing valid treaties; and, second, that the statute and treaty may be 
assessed separately under the Tenth Amendment. Holland rejected both of 
these assumptions. Still, lest it seem that this is a case of cherry-picking one 
misguided quotation, note that the quoted proposition is not an anomaly. The 
majority’s analysis relied on it. Roberts stressed, time and again, that 
interpreting section 229 to reach Bond’s local crimes would raise serious 
constitutional questions based on the structural principle that the federal 
government exercises only delegated powers and that crimes such as Bond’s 
would ordinarily fall within the state’s “police power.” In sum, the Court’s 
pervasive reliance on a federalism “background principle” and canon of 
constitutional avoidance to resolve section 229’s ambiguity was not just one 
factor among many; it was, in the majority’s view, dispositive.138 
From the perspective of the orthodox reading, one might raise the 
following objection: Leave aside the Tenth Amendment. The majority did not 
try to avoid deciding whether the Act violates that Amendment; it only sought 
to resolve section 229’s perceived ambiguity without considering whether 
Holland remains good law.139 The easiest way to accomplish this was to apply 
a routine canon of avoidance that counsels construing the Act such that 
Holland’s continuing validity would not affect the Act’s analysis regardless. 
That is why the Court insisted on “a clear indication that Congress meant to 
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reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language 
in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States.”140 For if the Court 
had not required this clear indication, then it would have needed to decide 
whether the statute’s expansive language intruded on police powers vouchsafed 
to the states by the Tenth Amendment. That is all, one might argue, the Court 
did; it avoided the constitutional issue in Holland by assuming that for treaty-
implementing legislation, as for other federal statutes, Congress legislates 
mindful of the background principle that federalism limits the reach of federal 
criminal law. 
Yet if that characterization of the Court’s approach is accurate, the 
majority misunderstood the implications of its analysis. After Holland, generic 
federalism principles are no longer a sound reason to believe that a treaty-
implementing statute violates the Tenth Amendment. The Bond Court’s 
application of the constitutional avoidance canon on this basis, however, 
assumes the contrary. Holland held, in relevant part, that an “invisible radiation 
from the terms of the Tenth Amendment,”141 or in Chief Justice Roberts’s 
substantively equivalent words, general “principles of federalism inherent in 
our constitutional structure,”142 do not carve out an exception to the otherwise 
plenary federal treaty power. That does not mean, as Holmes said, that there are 
no limits on the treaty power.143 It does, however, mean that in the context of a 
statute implementing a treaty, there are no limits based on general principles of 
federalism. 144  Holland, like any other precedent of the Supreme Court 
interpreting the Constitution, is (or was) itself part of the constitutional 
principles (here, of federalism) that, according to the Court, Congress must be 
presumed to respect when it legislates.145 The Court’s constitutional decisions 
have the same legal status as the document’s text—Congress may not 
supersede them. 146  The Court’s federalism background principle and 
associated canon of constitutional avoidance are themselves inconsistent with 
the Court’s own authoritative interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in 
Holland,147 unless and until the Court expressly overrules the case. 
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 146. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997)). 
 147. Roberts invoked the avoidance canon in an effort to decide Bond without being compelled 
to revisit the constitutional issue in Holland. But the only reason there was a constitutional issue to avoid 
was that the Court had tacitly rejected Holland. In the treaty context, the principles of federalism 
inherent in our constitutional structure, which emanate from the Tenth Amendment, as the Court has 
construed it, include Holland, thus obviating the same federalism concerns that, in Bond, animated its 
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The point merits some elaboration. The Court began its analysis of 
federalism in Part III.A of the Bond opinion by criticizing the government’s 
interpretation of section 229, according to which the statute reaches local 
crimes like Bond’s. It said that “this interpretation would dramatically intrude 
upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction, and we avoid reading statutes to 
have such reach in the absence of a clear indication that they do.”148 Then, at 
the close of this Part, after exploring a series of cases (none of which, tellingly, 
involved treaties) that invoked federalism as a principle of statutory 
interpretation, the Court concluded: 
These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of 
federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal statute. In 
this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the key 
statutory definition given the term—“chemical weapon”—being defined; the deeply 
serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any 
apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty 
about chemical warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we 
can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, 
before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes on the 
police power of the States.149 
The problem with this conclusion is twofold. First, because section 229 
implements a treaty, there is no dramatic intrusion upon traditional state 
criminal jurisdiction—unless the Court has tacitly abandoned Holland. Second, 
assuming, as the Bond Court implicitly did by trying to avoid the constitutional 
issue in Holland, that the latter case remains good law, the presumption that 
Congress legislates against a federalism background principle cannot do the 
interpretive work that the majority supposed. In the treaty context, after 
Holland, there is no reason to presume that Congress sought to preserve the 
usual federal-state balance that obtains outside the treaty context. Rather, the 
“principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure” include 
Holland’s doctrine that those principles do not compel federalism constraints 
on statutes implementing treaties. 150  Provided the Act were enacted to 
implement a constitutionally valid treaty (as all of the Justices in Bond regarded 
the CWC to be), generic “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional 
structure” would have been immaterial to, not the mandatory lodestar of, 
statutory construction. And it would have been equally immaterial that the Act, 
absent the treaty, might have intruded upon background principles of 
federalism against which Congress may be assumed ordinarily to legislate. 
 
invocation of the avoidance canon in the first place. 
 148. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. Id. at 2090. 
 150. Id. The Court might, of course, have logically concluded that because the CWC does not 
require implementation by federal criminal law, Congress exercised its discretion to respect general, 
non-doctrinal federalism concerns in implementing the CWC. After all, the federal government routinely 
does consider federalism when it negotiates treaties, and Congress may and likely does consider it as 
well in deciding how to implement treaties. In Holland, in contrast, the 1916 treaty arguably required 
Congress to intrude upon traditional federalism limits, and the evidence could not have been clearer that 
Congress also intended to transgress those limits. Bond’s assumption that Congress sought to respect the 
usual federal-state balance despite the CWC might be right; the legislative history behind the Act 
apparently did not clarify Congress’s intent in this regard. But, after Holland, the Court cannot assume 
that legislation implementing a treaty should be construed, if possible, to adhere to the same federal-
state balance as in a purely domestic context. 
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5. Carey v. South Dakota: The Constitutional Avoidance Canon in 
Context 
The prudential rationale for the canon of constitutional avoidance bears 
emphasis. It adjures judges to avoid interpreting an ambiguous statute in a 
manner that might raise a constitutional doubt—but only if another construction 
is equally plausible. We need not defend any position here on the merits of the 
Bond majority opinion’s approach to the Act’s statutory interpretation in 
contrast to that of Justice Scalia’s concurrence.151 But it is instructive to call 
attention to Scalia’s exasperation that, in his view, the majority misapplied the 
canon of constitutional avoidance in order to find the implementing legislation 
ambiguous based on federalism rather than, as it should have done, applied that 
canon only if and after finding the statute ambiguous—and only because of that 
ambiguity.152 
It is ironic in this regard, but not coincidental, that in the absence of a 
treaty, Justice Brandeis in Carey, like Chief Justice Roberts in Bond, also 
applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to a federal statute (for Brandeis, 
the Migratory Bird Act of 1913). For Brandeis’s opinion in Carey reveals how 
Roberts misunderstood the real issue in Bond. In short, Roberts treated Bond as 
the functional equivalent of Carey rather than Holland. But Carey arose under 
a federal law that did not implement a treaty. That law, the 1913 Migratory 
Bird Act, like the CWC Act in Bond, arguably raised Tenth Amendment issues, 
especially given the Court’s precedents affirming state authority over the 
regulation of migratory birds.153 But because of the treaty in Holland, unlike in 
Carey (decided only the previous year), Justice Holmes found no place for the 
canon of constitutional avoidance that Brandeis had applied in Carey. Brandeis 
agreed—for in Holland, unlike in Carey, the question had been the 
constitutional validity of the treaty and only derivatively that of the 
implementing legislation. 
In Carey, by contrast, the question had been the constitutionality of the 
1913 law, which substantively resembled the 1916 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 
but did not implement a treaty. Yet in Bond, Chief Justice Roberts applied the 
non-treaty analysis in Carey rather than the treaty analysis in Holland. It is 
telling that Brandeis, Carey’s author, joined Holland without reservation.154 
His distinct approaches to Carey and Holland, which he regarded as 
constitutionally consistent, show that Brandeis agreed with Holmes that a treaty 
fundamentally reorients the Tenth Amendment analysis.155 
 
 151. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 152. Id. at 2095-97. 
 153. See Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 120, 122 (1919). 
 154. The Tenth Amendment, that is, motivated Justice Brandeis to apply the constitutional 
avoidance canon in Carey. Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the same goes for Bond. But Carey did 
not consider the constitutional test of the treaty power. Nor did Carey require the Supreme Court to 
consider whether that test should include a federalism exemption to the treaty power, as did Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
 155. Id. at 432-33. Just as the 1916 migratory bird treaty in Holland rendered general Tenth 
Amendment limits irrelevant to its implementing statute, so too, in Bond—were it truly the case that it 
did not overrule Holland—should the CWC have rendered Tenth Amendment limits irrelevant to its 
implementing legislation. 
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In sum, had Chief Justice Roberts honored Holland, the real question in 
Bond would have been the federal government’s authority to enter into the 
CWC itself notwithstanding potential limits imposed by the Tenth 
Amendment.156 Justice Holmes did not (because he had no need to) speculate 
on the comparable issue in Holland. He simply said that the Court did not mean 
to imply that the treaty power has no limits.157 Under Holland, then, either a 
treaty is beyond the federal government’s Article II power—that is, an 
international agreement that the President plus two-thirds of the Senate may 
never constitutionally conclude—or it is not. If it is beyond the treaty power, 
then of course no statute to implement it could be constitutional. If it is not, 
then “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure” would 
not apply to its implementing legislation, just as they would not apply to the 
same treaty were it self-executing. Either Tenth Amendment limits apply to 
both, or they apply to neither. And in the event of an arguable ambiguity in the 
implementing legislation, mandatory application of the canon of constitutional 
avoidance based on federalism principles would be erroneous—or at least, 
contrary to what the Bond Court suggested, inconsistent with Holland. 
Bond’s application of the avoidance canon, which it deemed mandatory, 
not precatory, cannot be reconciled with Holland. There is only a reason to 
apply the canon—only a constitutional issue to avoid—if one assumes, as the 
Court did, that the statute might otherwise conflict with general principles of 
federalism. But if the Court did not disturb Holland, as it supposed, there is no 
worry that generic federalism principles call into question the Tenth 
Amendment validity of a statute that implements a concededly constitutional 
treaty—rendering the canon of constitutional avoidance superfluous. Instead, 
the Bond Court relied on that canon, albeit among other principles of statutory 
interpretation, to interpret a purportedly ambiguous statute one way rather than 
another. 
Because the Court did not see the presence of the CWC as relevant to the 
Tenth Amendment appraisal of the Act, it decided Bond by asking if the Act 
would be valid absent the treaty.158 And absent the treaty, the Bond Court held 
that it was not only “appropriate to apply the background assumption that 
Congress normally preserves the constitutional balance between the National 
Government and the States” but also required by “the very structure of the 
Constitution.”159 Had the Court, holding all else constant, employed that same 
assumption in Holland, Missouri would have prevailed: the law implementing 
the 1916 treaty would have been constitutionally required to conform to the 
same “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure”160 that 
would have applied in the absence of the treaty; and the Supreme Court had 
 
 156. In theory, Congress might enact an absurdly broad or otherwise manifestly inappropriate 
statute, ostensibly to implement a treaty—and that statute would be invalid. But it would not be invalid 
because of the Tenth Amendment; it would be invalid because it would not be a genuinely necessary and 
proper means to implement the treaty. Not surprisingly, given the political safeguards of federalism, the 
Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider this issue. 
 157. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
 158. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014). 
 159. Id. at 2091. 
 160. Id. at 2088. 
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held in Geer and Carey, both of which arose in a non-treaty context, that the 
regulation of the taking of migratory birds falls within the state’s police power 
despite incidental effects on commerce. Applying Bond’s methodology in 
Holland, the Court would therefore have been obliged to strike down the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act as a violation of the Tenth Amendment—for as 
Holmes affirmed, “but for the treaty, the State would be free to regulate this 
subject itself.”161 Consensus to the contrary notwithstanding, Bond abandoned 
Holland. 
IV. CRITIQUES OF HOLLAND: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Whether Holland’s substantive demise is cause for celebration is, of 
course, a different question. Fears of Holland’s supposed implications have 
never entirely receded. If we are right that Bond either effectively overruled 
Holland or, at a minimum, eviscerated its foundations, a word on the likely 
effects of this development is in order. In this and the following parts, we 
consider, respectively, the force of the chief critiques of Holland and the 
probable consequences, in a vastly changed international legal order, of the 
Court having now hobbled Bond. We point out how abandoning Holland will 
impede the United States’s ability to carry out certain international obligations. 
We begin in the first Section with a brief review of the nation’s experience with 
Holland in the century before Bond, for it supplies the appropriate empirical 
light in which to assess the chief objections to and critiques of Holland. In the 
latter two Sections, we then turn to the political and legal constraints, which, 
we suggest, dramatically mitigate, if not obviate, the threats Holland allegedly 
poses to our constitutional order. 
A. Before Bond: States’ Rights, Individual Rights, and the Lessons of 
History, Experience, and Jurisprudence 
Holmes’s opinion has never lacked critics.162 It generated controversy 
from the outset. Scholars almost immediately speculated about potential threats 
Holland might pose to both state and individual rights.163 Nine years after 
Holland, former Secretary of State and later Chief Justice Hughes launched a 
broadside against Holland in a speech to the American Society of International 
Law, arguing that the treaty power extends only to “properly” international 
issues.164 
 
 161. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. 
 162. Some commentators therefore bemoaned the Bond Court’s perceived refusal to revisit the 
constitutional issue. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, The Supreme Court Misses Its Chance to Limit the 
Treaty Power, FORBES (June 12, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/12/the-supreme 
-court-misses-its-chance-to-limit-the-treaty-power. 
 163. E.g., Thomas Reid Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-13 
(1920). 
 164. See Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1957) 
(quoting Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 194, 196 (1929)), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957); see also Bond, 
134 S. Ct. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), HENKIN, supra note 24, at 197, 471-72 
n.87; Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1151 (1956); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 117 (1965). 
Hughes’s objections reflected those made by Thomas Jefferson early in the nation’s history. See David 
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of 
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After World War II, Holland also provoked a political backlash. The 
postwar rise of international institutions and multilateral human rights treaties 
raised fears among some politicians that treaties would intrude upon national 
sovereignty. Foremost in the mind of many were worries that such treaties 
might empower the federal government to enact civil rights legislation that 
would preempt state segregation and other racially discriminatory laws. In 
1953, these fears culminated in Ohio Senator Bricker’s proposal of the 
infamous Bricker Amendment, which sought to overrule Holland by amending 
the Constitution to add that “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in 
the United States only through legislation that would be valid in the absence of 
a treaty.”165 The most prominent variation of the Amendment narrowly failed 
after President Eisenhower opposed it.166 But many continued to fear that 
Holland could be used to avoid all constitutional limits—not only, as Holmes 
had more judiciously put it, “some invisible radiation from the general terms of 
the Tenth Amendment.”167 The Supreme Court found a welcome opportunity 
to put that fear to rest—or at least attempt to do so—in 1957. 
In Reid v. Covert,168  the plaintiffs argued that Article 2(11) of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice—which, in conformity with executive status-
of-forces agreements, authorized the trial of civilian dependents of military 
service members abroad by court-martial—deprived them of due process under 
the Constitution.169 Echoing Holland, the government countered that Article 
2(11) could be “sustained as legislation which is necessary and proper to carry 
out the United States’ obligations under the international agreements made 
with” the host states.170 Justice Black, writing for a plurality, replied that “no 
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any 
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the 
Constitution . . . . The prohibitions of the Constitution . . . cannot be nullified 
by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined,”171 thus 
implying that the same result would be forthcoming under an Article II treaty 
as opposed to the executive agreements at issue in Reid.172 The Reid plurality 
also carefully distinguished Holland, in which, Black stressed, “[T]he treaty 
involved was not inconsistent with any specific provision of the Constitution. 
 
the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1187-88 (2000); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 41, at 15-
16. 
 165. S. REP. NO. 412, at 1, amend. 2 (1953). 
 166. Jide Nzelibe, Partisan Conflicts Over Presidential Authority, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
389, 428 (2011). See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A 
TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988). 
 167. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
 168. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 169. Id. at 3-4, 15-16; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amends. V & VI. 
 170. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16. 
 171. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). Because Reid involved only sole executive agreements, its 
reference to Article II treaties (“the Executive and Senate combined”) is dicta (in a plurality opinion); it 
therefore did not and could not overrule Holland. 
 172. Id. at 5-6. Justice Harlan concurred on the narrow ground that the defendants were tried for 
capital offenses. Id. at 65. But a majority of the Court found that distinction irrelevant three years later. 
Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 (1987); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323-24 
(1988). 
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The Court was concerned with the Tenth Amendment which reserves to the 
States or the people all power not delegated to the National Government.”173 
Reid has long been understood, correctly, to allay fears that Holland 
implies that treaties can supersede clear constitutional constraints. In 1987, the 
American Law Institute did not hesitate to codify in the new Restatement that 
“[n]o provision of an agreement may contravene any of the prohibitions or 
limitations of the Constitution applicable to the exercise of authority by the 
United States.”174 The following year, the Supreme Court, citing Reid, struck 
down on First Amendment grounds a provision of the D.C. Code prohibiting 
the display of any sign, or the congregation of three or more persons, within 
500 feet of a foreign embassy, if the display or congregation tended to bring 
that foreign government into public “odium” or “disrepute.”175 The Court so 
held even though, first, Congress enacted it pursuant to its power to “define and 
punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations,”176 and, second, the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the United States is a party and 
which “represents the current state of international law,” requires states “to take 
all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion 
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or 
impairment of its dignity.”177 
By the late twentieth century, it therefore seemed clear that Holland did 
not affect constitutional provisions apart from arguable Tenth Amendment 
limits. But the vitality of the Tenth Amendment as a check on the treaty power 
remained unclear. The Supreme Court continued to cite Holland in cases in 
which the Tenth Amendment might otherwise have presented a fatal barrier.178 
In fact, as of 2006, the Court’s Justices had cited Holland in thirty-four 
opinions, none of which overturned it.179 Lower courts too have applied and 
cited Holland as good law.180 
Yet for most intents and purposes, Holland scarcely mattered for decades. 
Roughly between the Bricker Amendment’s defeat in 1953 and the resurgence 
of states’ rights jurisprudence in the 1980s, the Court’s broad reading of the 
Commerce Clause enabled Congress to regulate virtually any activity, however 
attenuated its connection to federal interests. Canonical cases like Wickard v. 
Filburn,181 Katzenbach v. McClung,182 and other post-New Deal and Civil 
 
 173. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18. 
 174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 302(2) & cmt. b (1987). 
 175. Boos, 485 U.S. at 315 (quoting D.C. CODE § 22-1115 (1987)). But see Lawson & 
Seidman, supra note 41, at 6, 16-18 (arguing that the First Amendment does not apply to the treaty 
power). 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see Boos, 485 U.S. at 316. 
 177. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95. 
 178. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201, 225 (2004); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999). 
 179. See Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the 
Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1353 (2006). 
 180. E.g., United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 82-85 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Belfast, 611 
F.3d 783, 805-06 (11th Cir. 2010); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Lucci, 222 A.2d 522, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1966); see also Martin v. State, 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 6, 10 (1960). 
 181. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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Rights era cases expanded the scope of the Commerce Clause to all but 
eliminate constraints on Congress’s power to regulate issues that once might 
have been deemed clearly reserved to the states. To be sure, as late as 1976, in 
National League of Cities v. Usery,183 the Supreme Court, 5-4, said that the 
Tenth Amendment protects certain traditional or integral state functions from 
federal regulation (although it did not identify them). But a decade later, in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a similarly divided 
Court overturned National League, concluding that the distinction between 
traditional and non-traditional state functions could not be sustained “for 
purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause.”184 It “reject[ed], as 
unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from 
federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”185 
The Court thus embraced the idea that limits on federal power reside 
solely in the political safeguards of federalism,186 that is, structural features of 
the Constitution that “protect the States from overreaching by Congress,” for 
example, by giving the states prominent “role[s] in the selection both of the 
Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.”187 For as 
long as this view prevailed, Holland’s merits seemed mostly academic. 
Jurisprudential developments since 1920 would have rendered it unnecessary 
for the federal government to protect migratory birds that routinely cross 
international and state borders by concluding a treaty. The Commerce Clause 
would have sufficed. No longer, in other words, did it seem “obvious” that 
there were “matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an 
act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act 
could.”188 
But the jurisprudential tide shifted under Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
leadership as the Court breathed new life into federalism. Among other 
developments reinvigorating federalism, the Rehnquist Court invalidated 
federal laws commandeering state legislatures and executive officials; 189 
expanded the scope of the Eleventh Amendment to confer upon the states 
immunity from suit in most cases;190 and for the first time since the New Deal, 
struck down federal laws as beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.191 
Furthermore, although the Court has not overruled Garcia explicitly, it has 
 
 182. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 183. 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976). 
 184. 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985). 
 185. Id. at 546-47. 
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Supreme Court has expressly adopted this view in several cases. E.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120. 
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decided several cases that seem to be in considerable tension with Garcia’s 
rejection of the idea of traditional state functions.192  Holland’s potential 
implications therefore began to resurface insofar as they might enable the 
federal government to accomplish by treaty what is now foreclosed by the 
Tenth Amendment. This prospect has long been among the chief critiques of 
Holland,193 and it has reemerged because of developments in both national and 
international law. 
B. The Political and Legal Limits of Holland 
1. Political Constraints: A Short, Not-So-Horrible Parade 
Before considering Bond’s future consequences more closely, it is 
prudent to put into some perspective a red herring that persists despite a century 
of experience with Holland: the parade of horribles that Holland supposedly set 
to march. Critics of Holland have long constructed a variety of implausible 
hypothetical scenarios. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Bond is a recent 
exemplar: 
[T]he possibilities of what the Federal Government may accomplish, with the right 
treaty in hand, are endless and hardly farfetched. . . . For example, the holding that a 
statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms near schools went beyond Congress’s 
enumerated powers, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 512 (1995), could be 
reversed by negotiating a treaty with Latvia providing that neither sovereign would 
permit the carrying of guns near schools.194 
Similarly, Justice Scalia suggested, the United States could bar “state 
inheritance taxes on real property” to implement a treaty. Among other jurists 
over the years, he concluded based on such speculation that “Holland places 
Congress only one treaty away from acquiring a general police power.”195 
Hypotheticals of this sort have been bandied about since the Court 
decided Holland. Any competent law professor can construct countless others. 
Senator Bricker and his colleagues took them seriously, and Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence shows that this worry persists. Yet it is both fair and accurate to 
describe such hypotheticals as farfetched. Holland has been good law for 
almost a century. No one can point to a single real example of abuse. In the 
ninety-four years since Holland—through World War II, global economic 
integration, massive immigration flows, the modern conflict with transnational 
terrorism, and all the familiar dislocations that beset the modern world—the 
federal government has never, never, sought to evade a Supreme Court decision 
or otherwise circumvent the Constitution by concluding a contrived treaty with 
a foreign nation. It is not difficult to see why. 
First, whatever the general force of the political safeguards of federalism, 
 
 192. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). See generally John C. Yoo, 
The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997). 
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they prove manifestly effective in the treaty realm. 196  The Constitution 
deliberately makes it difficult to conclude treaties. Under Article II, the 
President may ratify a treaty only with the concurrence of two-thirds of the 
Senate.197 Securing that concurrence is no simple matter—and it shows.198 
Consider a few examples: the United States has refused to ratify, among other 
treaties, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,199 which 
essentially codified U.S. law internationally;200 the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, which only the United States has not ratified; 201  and the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite a widespread belief that it would 
further the national interest.202 
Second, constituents hold senators accountable. Except perhaps in 
(historically unprecedented) exigent circumstances, senators would be highly 
unlikely to agree to an ersatz treaty crafted by the executive branch simply to 
override state authority or “overrule” a disfavored Supreme Court decision. As 
Professor Epps observed, commenting on Justice Scalia’s hypothetical treaty 
with Latvia, “67 senators or so (depending on the number voting), after a public 
debate, would have to agree that Latvian-U.S. relations should govern guns in 
American high schools,” and because the Constitution guarantees all states two 
senators regardless of their populations, “[e]ven in a harmonious Senate, 
senators representing roughly 7.5 percent of the population could block a gun 
treaty.”203 
Third, it is unclear why the federal government would have an interest in 
arrogating to itself power over traditional state functions like probate. It is no 
accident that it has never sought to conclude a treaty for the purpose of taking 
over a traditional state police power. To the contrary, it has become 
commonplace for the federal government to insert federalism clauses in 
international agreements in order to protect the states from intrusion upon their 
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traditional powers.204 Senators often insist upon these provisions as a condition 
of their consent, often because the states carry out their functions ably, and 
Senators see no need to fix what does not need fixing. 
Finally, of course, treaties require two parties: the United Kingdom and 
the United States had a mutual interest in cooperating to preserve migratory 
birds that traversed international, not just state, borders. Absent a similar 
mutual interest, it would require a good measure of (passing strange) collusion 
for Latvia, or any foreign nation, to enter into a contrived treaty with the United 
States to enable the federal government to keep guns out of school zones—or, 
in general, to expand federal power at the expense of the states.205 And it is a 
virtual certainty that any such contrivance would become evident long before 
the treaty received the consideration, still less approval, of the Senate. 
In sum, “Holland places Congress only one treaty away from acquiring a 
general police power”206 only in an imaginary world—not the one in which we 
live. 
2. Legal Constraints: The Scope of Holland 
The lessons of practice, experience, and history notwithstanding, some 
critics object to Holland’s supposed theoretical scope: did the Framers really 
vest the federal government with the potential power to vitiate the Tenth 
Amendment altogether, subject to finding the right treaty partner? How could 
that be consistent with the foundational principle that the Constitution 
establishes a federal government with delegated powers only, all residual 
authority remaining with the states? Tellingly, Holmes did not offer a general 
theory of the scope and limits of the treaty power. Holland did not require it. 
Extensive dicta on such a critical constitutional issue would have been, literally 
and figuratively, injudicious. We cannot and should not, therefore, try to draw 
any firm conclusions about Holmes’s view of issues beyond those he 
addressed. Indeed, far from offering needless, imprudent speculation in 
Holland, the dicta in Holmes’s brief opinion served only to reinforce the 
limited scope of his decision. Properly understood, Holmes’s analysis does not 
conflict with the principle that the Constitution established a federal 
government of delegated, limited powers. 
Holmes predicated his analysis in Holland on an Article II treaty.207 The 
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decision’s logic is properly limited to that context. Holmes presupposed that 
Article II establishes a federal lawmaking power in the President and Senate 
that is conceptually and in its scope distinct from that of Congress under Article 
I. That is why, Holmes argued, an act of Congress to implement an Article II 
treaty may sometimes accomplish what an act of Congress under Article I, 
Section 8, alone, may not. Beyond doubts in some scholarly quarters about the 
constitutionality of other types of U.S. international agreements, 208  it is 
therefore clear that neither congressional-executive nor sole executive 
agreements suffice under Holland. Henkin aptly summarized Holmes’s logic in 
this regard: 
What he said, simply, was that the Constitution delegated powers to various 
branches of the federal government, not only to Congress; the Treaty Power was 
delegated to the federal treaty-makers, a delegation additional to and independent of 
the delegations to Congress. Since the Treaty Power was delegated to the federal 
government, whatever is within its scope is not reserved to the states: the Tenth 
Amendment is not material. Many matters, then, may appear to be ‘reserved to the 
States’ as regards domestic legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate 
them; but they are not reserved to the states so as to exclude their regulation by 
international agreement.209 
In other words, certain matters fall within the domain of the treaty power, and 
hence the federal government, even though they do not fall within the domain 
of congressional power. 
Henkin’s insight posits two additional legal limits on Holland’s doctrinal 
scope. First, Holland “did not say that there were no limitations on the Treaty 
Power in favor of the states, only that there were none in any ‘invisible 
radiation’ from the Tenth Amendment.”210 The phrase “invisible radiation” is a 
rhetorical flourish, but Holmes’s essential point is clear. The general terms of 
the Tenth Amendment (reserving to the states or the people what the 
Constitution does not delegate to the federal government) do not establish a 
nebulous penumbra of state authority that limits the treaty power. Scholars have 
argued, however, that specific federalism constraints exist, for example, that the 
federal government may not, by treaty, cede state territory to a foreign nation 
without that state’s consent, deny to any state a republican form of government, 
or abolish state militias.211 We take no position on these issues here, except to 
say that we see no basis for the limitation suggested by Justice Thomas in 
Bond, and by Hughes and others before him, namely, the supposed distinction 
between “proper” international and (qualitatively distinct) domestic issues.212 
Second, Holland’s doctrine is limited to the structural allocation of power 
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between the federal and state governments. “Many matters,” Henkin wrote, 
“may appear to be ‘reserved to the States’ as regards domestic legislation if 
Congress does not have power to regulate them; but they are not reserved to the 
states so as to exclude their regulation by international agreement.”213 Justice 
Holmes interpreted the Treaty Clause relative to the Tenth Amendment, not any 
other provision of the Constitution. In particular, he neither said nor implied 
anything about the Bill of Rights. As the Court has since held, no treaty may 
infringe individual rights, such as the right to grand jury indictment, jury trial, 
and freedom of expression. Note, therefore, that after District of Columbia v. 
Heller,214 not only would a hypothetical gun treaty with Latvia, as a political 
matter, stand no chance of being concluded, it would also, as a legal matter, be 
presumptively unconstitutional under Reid insofar as it infringed upon the right 
to possess a handgun for lawful purposes as affirmed in Heller. 
It may be objected, as it has been, that there is no principled basis upon 
which to limit Holland to the Tenth Amendment alone, insulating the rights of 
individuals, but not states, from the doctrine’s ambit. Not so. Holland speaks to 
a structural issue raised by the Tenth Amendment about the allocation of 
federal and state authority. It does not increase the aggregate power of 
government within the United States (state and federal) at the expense of the 
governed. In other words, Holland holds that treaties may adjust which 
government has authority to exercise a particular power.215 But nowhere does 
Holmes suggest that treaties confer on government, state or federal, any power 
that the Constitution otherwise denies to government in the aggregate. 
Consider Holland itself: it established that to the extent necessary to carry 
out treaty obligations to the United Kingdom, federal rather than state 
government had the power to regulate migratory birds. Absent the 1916 treaty, 
the same power existed; it is just that the power would have remained with the 
states rather than the federal government. No one argued (it would have been 
absurd) that the Constitution protects the people from governmental regulation 
of migratory birds—as it protects the people from, for example, deprivation of 
liberty without due process of law. Nor did Justice Holmes suggest that the 
1916 treaty gave government, state and federal, any power it would otherwise 
lack under the Constitution. In Bond, similarly, Bond challenged the federal 
government’s right to make it a crime to prosecute her for a “purely local” 
assault with a chemical weapon.216 She did not dispute that Pennsylvania, the 
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relevant state government, had the power to make precisely the same conduct a 
crime and to prosecute her under its laws. The Court agreed: “It is . . . clear that 
the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (and every other State) are 
sufficient to prosecute Bond. Pennsylvania has several statutes that would 
likely cover her assault. . . . And state authorities regularly enforce these laws 
in poisoning cases.”217 All this is to reaffirm from another perspective the 
abiding truth of Justice Black’s reassurance in Reid v. Covert.218 
Finally, Holland may not have proclaimed as broad a doctrine as some of 
its critics suppose. To see why, reconsider two passages from the opinion. First, 
early in the analysis, Holmes wrote: 
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making 
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may 
be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of 
Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it 
is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power 
which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is not 
to be found. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1902). What was said in that case 
with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of the 
nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent to act.219 
Later, he concluded: 
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be 
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. . . . It is not 
sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the 
question is whether the United States is forbidden to act.220 
These passages may suggest a narrower legal doctrine, which, quite apart 
from the political safeguards of federalism, does not necessarily place 
traditional state powers at the mere whim of the federal government. Holmes 
began with the “general question” of the test of the treaty power’s scope in the 
face of a claimed Tenth Amendment “exemption.” He rejected the argument 
that the Tenth Amendment, as such, creates an omnibus exemption. Article II, 
he observed, delegates the treaty power to the federal government, and hence, 
“whatever is within its scope is not reserved to the states: the Tenth 
Amendment is not material.”221 That observation need not, and presumably 
does not, mean that just anything is “within its scope”; if anything, it implies 
the contrary. Holmes said only that the limits of the treaty power “must be 
ascertained in a different way.”222  But with reference to the rationale of 
Andrews and Holland’s language, that way may depend on the ability of the 
United States to vindicate national interests in circumstances where, first, 
effective regulation necessitates “national action in concert with that of another 
power”; and, second, either the states would be “incompetent to act” or reliance 
upon them would be “vain”—a more circumscribed conception of Holland’s 
doctrinal reach. 
 
 217. Id. at 2092. 
 218. 354 U.S. 1, 3, 16 (1957). 
 219. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1902). 
 220. Id. at 435. 
 221. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 191 (emphasis added). 
 222. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
2016] The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v. Holland  91 
  
Holmes, again, took a pragmatic view of constitutional adjudication. He 
saw “nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government” to stay its hand 
despite the manifest inability of the states to handle a pressing national issue.223 
The Constitution establishes a functional and durable government for the whole 
nation. It should not be interpreted to deprive government in the aggregate, 
state and federal, of the ability to act effectively to address a critical national 
need. In Andrews, as we saw above, Justice White confronted a situation in 
which the interaction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and a Massachusetts 
state law might yield the conclusion that neither federal nor state government 
could effectively regulate a vital legal issue—the institution of marriage, as it 
was understood at the time. Holmes therefore quoted Andrews for the 
proposition that “it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring 
national action, ‘a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every 
civilized government’ is not to be found . . . . What was said in that case with 
regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of the 
nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent to act.”224 
Both Andrews and Holland thus resolved perceived conflicts between 
state and federal power internal to the Constitution. We need not, in other 
words, read the passages in these cases about “civilized government” and the 
like to refer to extraconstitutional conceptions of law inherent in sovereignty or 
nationhood.225 Nor should we. It is well-known that Holmes disdained such 
metaphysical or transcendental conceptions of natural law.226 
Because the Constitution establishes a government intended to endure and 
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function for ages to come, it would be dysfunctional for the Constitution—
hence “not lightly to be assumed”—to disable the federalist system it 
establishes from enabling government, state or federal as the case may be, from 
meeting real though unforeseen, and perhaps unforeseeable, challenges. 
Holland, read in light of Andrews, construed the treaty power to extend to 
situations where the nation seeks to vindicate an interest of “very nearly the 
first magnitude”; reliance upon the states would be in vain; and action in 
concert with another country would empower government to address the issue 
effectively. There is no reason to construe the Constitution to disallow 
Holland’s reading of the treaty power based on an “invisible radiation from the 
general terms of the Tenth Amendment.”227 
Holland’s doctrine therefore does not, as a matter of law, risk the kind of 
expansion of federal power at the expense of the states that worries its critics. 
Andrews and Holland alike imply legal, as well as political, limits on the 
latter’s doctrine. Justice Black’s opinion in Reid suggests the same, for its 
consistency with Holland rests on Black’s statement that Holland had not been 
concerned with “any specific provision of the Constitution,” only the scope of 
the Tenth Amendment.228 
V. HOLLAND AND THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 
A. After Bond: The Treaty Power and Federalism in Contemporary 
Perspective 
Scholars have, as noted, criticized Holland on historical, structural, 
textual, and other grounds.229 Many of these critiques can be, and have been, 
answered on their own terms, 230  persuasively or not, and it would be 
superfluous to rehearse them. Yet the scholarly debate over Holland has taken 
place largely within the confines of constitutional methodologies that Justice 
Holmes would have rejected. Consequently, they tend to miss the force of 
Holland’s abiding functionalist, adaptivist rationale. 
Holmes was a pragmatist. 231  His methodology of constitutional 
adjudication reflected it,232 as, of course, did Holland. The decision relied, as 
Holmes candidly wrote, on a vision of the Constitution as an organic document 
that has adapted, as it should, to evolving national conditions in the light of 
history, practice, and experience. Constitutional adjudication should preserve 
and contribute to the strong foundation established by the Constitution for the 
United States as “a nation.”233 Holmes did not believe the Tenth Amendment 
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froze in time a static set of rights reserved to thirteen agrarian states in a 
precarious seaboard republic of 3.5 million people.234 
Echoing Chief Justice Marshall, he wrote of the Constitution as a 
foundational but organic document, constitutive of a nation, and “intended to 
endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises 
of human affairs.”235 The Constitution therefore does not establish a set of 
“immutable rules,” which could disable the nation’s government from 
responding to future “exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen 
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.”236 To the contrary, 
like Justice White in Andrews, Justice Holmes sought to interpret the 
Constitution to work—to function as durable, foundational law for the system 
of government it establishes, including, but not limited to, the federal structure 
of the United States. Holland interpreted the Article II treaty power to enable a 
functional, but interstitial, adjustment of the allocation of authority between the 
states and the federal government, which the Constitution, respectively, 
presupposed and established. 
One may, of course, reject Holmes’s jurisprudential approach. By 
describing it, we do not blithely dismiss critiques of Holland that sound in other 
approaches to constitutional adjudication. We do, however, consider it 
appropriate to assess Holland on its own terms. Assuming, as Holmes did, that 
the Constitution is a document “intended to endure for ages to come”237—that it 
must adapt to “exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, 
and which can be best provided for as they occur”238—what might be the 
consequences for the nation of abandoning Holland? If Bond effectively 
eviscerated Holland, as we have argued, what effects might we expect in the 
future? 
Despite Holland’s periodic citation by the courts,239 its real-world effects 
to date, as noted earlier, have been modest. In part, the reason for this is 
historical and traces to the post-New Deal expansion of congressional power. 
But the reason is also diplomatic, reflecting the federal government’s 
reluctance to conclude treaties that intrude on traditional state functions. When 
it has concluded such treaties, it has often included federalism clauses or 
textual reservations intended to reassure the states or protect traditional state 
authority.240 If the federal government’s practices in this regard continue, the 
issue in Holland may not arise frequently. 
B. What the Future Holds 
Yet Holland’s limited influence in the past may be an unreliable 
barometer of its impact in the future. Today, more than ever before, the nation’s 
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needs often require state deference to federal foreign-affairs interests. If this 
historical trajectory continues, Bond’s effects may begin to look both serious 
and unwelcome. 241  The federal government had substantial reasons for 
submitting a brief that implored the Court not to overrule Holland.242 Whether 
Holland remains good law might “alter U.S. positions in international 
negotiations.”243 Why is that a problem? The federal government, as noted, has 
long sought, often successfully, to accommodate state concerns and interests in 
the course of treaty negotiations; and the political safeguards of federalism all 
but guarantee that the government’s practices in this regard will persist. 
Furthermore, if, as we suggested earlier, the most common concerns have been 
overstated, and if, as we also noted earlier, the effect of Holland has thus far 
been marginal, why might the Holland doctrine nonetheless prove to be of 
more than academic interest? The answer revolves around postwar changes in 
international law, in particular, the modern law of treaties, which constitute the 
predominant source of international law today, in contrast to custom’s 
predominance in the past.244 
C. The Postwar Evolution of Treaty Law 
It is a truism that international law now governs far more than relations 
between nations. What some scholars call transnational law includes issues of 
trade, foreign investment, war, international crime, national security, 
international organizations, jurisdiction, global commons, human rights, and 
international administrative law. It also subsumes the full spectrum of 
international dispute resolution: the International Court of Justice; WTO 
panels; the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; private international 
arbitral tribunals for commercial, investment, and other disputes; ad hoc, 
hybrid, and permanent international criminal courts; and diverse committees 
and quasi-judicial bodies established by treaty. The United States participates 
in all these areas of international law. As the world’s largest economic and 
military power, it has an especially strong interest in its ability to shape and 
sustain them. 
Today, however, the principal source of international law is no longer 
custom but treaties, often multilateral treaties. Some treaties, such as the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,245 comprehensively regulate fields that 
were once governed by custom. The law of treaties has also evolved 
substantially since 1789, as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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Treaties.246 Many contemporary treaties differ from the contractual paradigm 
of the nineteenth century.247 Some multilateral treaties, chiefly international 
human rights treaties, also govern how a nation treats its own citizens or other 
traditionally domestic matters. 
The idea that only properly international issues may be the subject of 
treaties—as Charles Evans Hughes, Thomas Jefferson, and others once 
suggested—is anachronistic. It assumes an unrealistic (and often arbitrary) 
brightline distinction between domestic and international issues. 248  Most 
treaties still do not intrude upon “purely local” issues within the realm of 
traditional state functions. But some do—and as in 1789, reliance on the states 
to carry out, or uniformly interpret, national treaty obligations may sometimes 
be in vain. Modern multilateral treaties that deal with matters such as trade, 
investment, the environment, and international organizations, among other 
issues, may entail obligations that involve, which need not mean intrude upon, 
traditional state functions. 
With more and more issues requiring international cooperation—for 
example, global warming—the need to avoid brightline subject-matter 
limitations on treaties is more pressing than ever. Absent Holland’s sensible 
doctrine, the limitations imposed by the Tenth Amendment would risk 
undermining confidence in the United States as a treaty partner, as the United 
States emphasized in its brief in Bond.249 The United States can sometimes 
accommodate or allay the concerns of potential treaty partners by crafting 
federalism clauses or including reservations—but not always. Reservations 
may be at odds with the object and purpose of the treaty. This might be true, for 
example, of a treaty requiring intrastate environmental regulations. Yet even 
before Bond, the Court suggested that federal regulation of an intrastate body of 
water might well be in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 250  Other 
reservations might be excluded by the terms of the treaty, as they are, for 
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example, by the Convention on the Law of the Sea.251 
These changes reinforce the need to preserve Holland’s doctrine. It alone 
enables the Treaty Clause to deal flexibly with powers and rights that might 
otherwise be deemed integral state functions and hence immune from, even 
vital, national regulation. On balance, then, we suggest that it would have been 
at least valuable, and may well turn out to be critical, to preserve Holland. The 
United States must remain able to adapt to an era in which most international 
law is based on treaties and in which participation in the international legal 
system will at times require flexibility in the allocation of federal and state 
power. Flexibility is imperative in the practice of diplomacy no less than in the 
Court’s own case law concerning diplomacy. Indeed, one consequence of 
abandoning Holland is evident in its effect on one of the most significant 
Supreme Court decisions on U.S. treaty law in decades, Medellín v. Texas.252 
Bond has rendered it all but incoherent. 
D. Medellín’s New Incoherence 
Beginning with the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in 
Breard253  and, as a consequence, the Court’s brief opinion in Breard v. 
Greene,254 the ICJ decided a trio of cases under the Optional Protocol to the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Optional Protocol).255 In each, 
states had convicted and sentenced foreign nationals to death following their 
convictions in trials in which the defendants were denied the right to consular 
assistance under Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(VCCR).256 The United States is a party to the VCCR, and Article 38 is self-
executing in that it imposes obligations on the United States, including all 
relevant federal and state officials who act on the nation’s behalf, without the 
need for implementing legislation.257  Article 38 is, under the Supremacy 
Clause, the “Law of the Land.”258 In Avena, the last of the ICJ cases, the ICJ 
held that the United States was under an obligation to allow some fifty Mexican 
nationals on death row in various states, all of whom had been denied their 
Article 38 right to consular assistance under the VCCR, to have their 
convictions and sentences reviewed and reconsidered.259 The ICJ also held that 
the requirement of review and reconsideration should be carried out by the 
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judiciary.260 
After Avena, President George W. Bush withdrew from the Optional 
Protocol,261 which had supplied the ICJ with the jurisdiction to decide the 
VCCR disputes.262 But under the U.N. Charter, “[e]ach Member of the United 
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of 
Justice in any case to which it is a party.”263 As a matter of international law, 
the United States therefore remained under a treaty obligation to comply with 
the ICJ’s final judgment in Avena,264 which the Court rendered before U.S. 
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. President Bush accordingly issued a 
statement indicating that he had determined that in order to give effect to the 
ICJ’s decision, state courts that had sentenced the Mexican nationals named in 
Avena should give effect to the ICJ requirement of review and reconsideration 
by applying general principles of comity.265 Many states refused, even though 
every state official (governors, state court judges, attorney generals, line 
prosecutors, and so forth) is part of, and acts on behalf of, the United States as a 
nation—the legal entity to which the ICJ properly directed its judgment under 
international law.266 
Most states either did not recognize the international obligation as legally 
binding or simply refused to abide by it,267 conduct that cannot fail to call to 
mind the problems experienced by the nation under the Articles of 
Confederation. But apart from President Bush’s unilateral directive, the federal 
government, too, failed to take action to respect the international obligation 
imposed by Avena (in combination with the VCCR, the Optional Protocol, and 
the U.N. Charter): Congress did not try to enact legislation authorizing 
compliance; the U.S. Attorney General did not bring suit to compel 
enforcement of the international obligation against recalcitrant state officials; 
and both federal and state judicial officers, by and large, gave the ICJ’s 
judgment, at best, the “respectful consideration” that the Supreme Court had 
suggested in its brief per curiam opinion from 1998 denying Breard’s 
application for a stay of execution based on a prior provisional order of the 
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ICJ.268 
When these issues reached the Supreme Court, it too declined to see itself 
as under a direct obligation to give judicial effect to the ICJ’s judgment, in part 
because it found the U.N. Charter (the treaty that imposed the obligation on the 
United States to undertake to comply with Avena) non-self-executing.269 It 
further held that President Bush’s directive to the state courts to effectuate the 
decision by reviewing the convictions and sentences in conformity with general 
principles of comity exceeded his power: “The President has an array of 
political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, 
but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one 
is not among them. The responsibility for transforming an international 
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to 
Congress.”270 Nor, the Court held, did the President have power, in effect, to 
rewrite state judicial standards—that is, rules of decision—to be applied to 
pending (or any) criminal cases.271 
Medellín is, in our view, problematic in many respects; what is relevant 
here, however, is not its arguable doctrinal deficiencies but its conclusion that 
responsibility for effectuating U.S. international obligations under Avena “falls 
to Congress.”272 In particular, the Court held that the United States may give 
“domestic effect to an international treaty obligation under the Constitution” in 
two potential ways—but in either case, compliance “requires joint action by the 
Executive and Legislative Branches: The Senate can ratify a self-executing 
treaty made by the Executive, or, if the ratified treaty is not self-executing, 
Congress can enact implementing legislation approved by the President.”273 
This resolution seems plausible under Holland: Congress could exercise 
its Necessary and Proper Clause powers to enact federal law to carry into effect 
U.S. treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter (emanating from the final Avena 
judgment), and the implementing legislation would bind the states even if, 
absent treaty obligations, Congress would lack the power to require state courts 
to review and reconsider the relevant capital convictions and sentences of 
Mexican nationals. After Bond, however, this route to discharging the Avena 
judgment’s obligations would be unconstitutional. After Bond, had the federal 
government sought to effectuate the international obligation imposed by Article 
94 of the U.N. Charter, which the Supreme Court found to be non-self-
executing, 274  by passing implementing legislation, that law would have 
violated the Tenth Amendment. As the Bond Court said, a treaty’s 
implementing legislation, that is, “the statute—unlike the Convention—must be 
read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional 
structure.” 275  It is difficult to imagine a state function more integral or 
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traditional than the general police power to define and punish “purely local” 
crimes.276 The criminal law at issue in Bond, as the Court there insisted, would 
ordinarily be of “the sort . . . regulated by the States.”277 
The Mexican nationals within the ambit of Avena had likewise been 
convicted and sentenced under “purely local” state criminal laws. As 
horrendous as their capital crimes were, none of them fell within the scope of 
the federal government’s power under Article I, Section 8—or any other 
delegated federal power. Absent the interpretation given to the Treaty Clause’s 
interaction with the Tenth Amendment in Holland, the federal government 
lacks power to interfere with purely local criminal laws and their 
administration. Congress has no power to compel state courts to review and 
reconsider state criminal convictions and sentences under a retroactive 
standard. The only way in which Congress could have carried out 
acknowledged U.S. international obligations emanating from the treaties at 
issue, as the Medellín Court held that it alone could do,278 would have been by 
resorting to the Necessary and Proper Clause.279 In particular, it would have 
needed to enact legislation necessary and proper to implement the international 
obligation incurred by the United States based on the combination of four 
treaties: the VCCR, the Optional Protocol, the Avena decision, and the U.N. 
Charter. 
Had Holland survived Bond, then the means by which the Medellín Court 
suggested that the United States could discharge non-self-executing treaty 
obligations would at least be intelligible. Congress would have the authority to 
enact legislation to require the states to carry out U.S. international 
obligations—notwithstanding that, absent the treaties at issue, authority over 
“purely local” criminal laws would remain within the reserved powers of the 
states under the Tenth Amendment. But if Holland is no longer good law, then 
the Supreme Court has held in Medellín that the United States, as a nation, is 
incapable of complying with its international legal obligations under Avena—
or any similar obligation in the future: the President cannot bring the nation 
into compliance by unilateral declaration.280 The federal courts cannot require 
compliance because of the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, as interpreted 
in Medellín.281 And now, after Bond, Congress too, despite what the Court said 
in Medellín, cannot enforce the nation’s international obligations under either 
Article I, Section 8, or Article I in combination with the Article II treaty power. 
Holland’s doctrine—that “there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the 
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty 
followed by such an act could”282—was the sole route to compliance with the 
ICJ’s judgment. Bond has blocked that route. 
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E. U.S. Treaty Practice After Bond 
Avena aptly illustrates the predicament the United States faces today 
because of the complexity and nature of modern treaty law.283 Today, as in 
1789 and before, the states cannot always be relied upon to carry out the 
international obligations of the United States. The resistance of the states to 
treaty obligations they found distasteful—a paramount motivation for the 
Philadelphia Convention culminating in the Constitution—did not cease in 
1789. And although the United States is obviously not at risk of war with 
Mexico, the states in Avena placed the nation in an awkward, diplomatically 
harmful situation. To paraphrase Hamilton’s remark in The Federalist, after 
Bond and contrary to the clear intent of the Framers, “the peace of the 
WHOLE” may now indeed “be left at the disposal of a PART.”284 
In Bond, the Court reasoned that Pennsylvania criminal law would suffice 
to carry out the nation’s CWC international obligation to punish violations 
under the treaty. Perhaps. But that is merely adventitious. Another state might 
not have enacted a law that suffices to carry out CWC prosecution 
obligations—or those contained in other treaties that require conduct in legal 
domains traditionally deemed “purely local.” Why should the ability of the 
United States to comply with a legitimate treaty obligation depend on the 
fortuity of whether a state happens to have passed a law sufficient for that 
purpose? 
Avena also reinforces the contemporary need to understand the Tenth 
Amendment within the context of a functional Constitution—one that respects 
federalism and preserves its value in our constitutional order but does not set it 
up as a constraint on the nation’s ability to act internationally or adhere to 
international obligations. Justice Holmes’s words in Holland still ring true 
today: “We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that 
Amendment has reserved.”285 By abandoning Holland, as the wreckage of 
Medellín suggests, the Supreme Court took a potentially dangerous step 
backwards toward recreating one of the foremost problems that beset the new 
nation under the Articles of Confederation. The Framers sought to resolve that 
problem by making treaties the supreme law of the land and vesting the treaty 
power exclusively in the federal government, thus giving it the power to 
enforce international obligations against recalcitrant states. Bond makes that not 
only more difficult but, at times, unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
“[I]t is not lightly to be assumed,” Holmes wrote, “that, in matters 
requiring national action, ‘a power which must belong to and somewhere reside 
in every civilized government’ is not to be found.”286 To have found a Tenth 
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Amendment impediment to a treaty regulating migratory waterfowl would have 
denied the federal government the authority to make that agreement. It would 
have required would-be treaty partners to negotiate with the forty-eight states 
of the Union instead—forty-eight different negotiations, state by state. That 
cannot be the system established by the Framers under the Constitution. 
True, the federal government retains domestic discretion to refuse to 
implement a treaty. But the option of dishonoring U.S. obligations 
internationally ought not be cavalierly embraced. Vindicating the high purposes 
of the Constitution, so eloquently set forth in its Preamble, depends upon 
preserving the nation’s credibility. It does not do to waive off this enduring 
imperative, as the Bond Court did, with a thin, formal reference to Congress’s 
discretion to disregard U.S. international obligations—all the while purporting 
to apply a mere (but, after Bond, mandatory) canon of construction to laws 
implementing treaties. 287  Preserving national credibility requires honoring 
rather than betraying treaty commitments. This, in the final analysis, is 
Holland’s raison d’être, to which Bond is oblivious. 
Treaty law in the United States, like so much else in U.S. foreign 
relations law, has always been shaped by history, tradition, principle, and 
practice—by experience, as Holmes wrote elsewhere, rather than logic alone.288 
Nothing in the experience of the United States revealed a need to abandon 
Holland. And if experience establishes the need, at times, to make treaties that 
arguably intrude on traditional conceptions of the boundaries of federalism in 
domestic circumstances, it is difficult to see why the constitutional law of 
treaties is not properly read to accommodate the needs of the nation that the 
Constitution established for ages to come. Bond debilitated Holland. The 
Court—and, we fear, the nation—will come to regret it. 
Yet Holland can likely be salvaged without retreating explicitly from 
Bond. Precisely because the Court did not expressly overrule Holland, it need 
not reverse itself again in a future decision in order to revive Holland. As we 
have suggested, the Court could have, as indeed it should have, treated 
background principles and statutory canons of federalism as incorporating the 
Court’s own interpretation of those principles in Holland. The Court could 
simply make clear that, consistent with what it held in Holland, the federalism 
principles that Congress should be presumed to bear in mind when it legislates 
include Justice Holmes’s analysis of the interaction between the Article II 
treaty power and the Tenth Amendment. 
Like other structural principles of the Constitution, such as the separation 
of powers, federalism cannot be reduced to brightline rules or formulae. The 
Court should, as it has in the past, consider the values that the principles of 
federalism serve in the U.S. constitutional system. In the spirit of McCulloch, 
those principles must be adapted to the exigencies, needs, and global context of 
the nation the Constitution established “to endure for ages to come.”289 The 
spirit of McCulloch is also the spirit of Holland. 
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